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SUMMARY 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the inadequate driving forces for Roma-
nian convergence with the EU and provide further explanatory variables for 
the uneven convergence performance of EU newcomers in general. Conver-
gence cannot be taken for granted. What turns out to provide a real ex-
planatory dimension is analysis of the convergence speed of CEE countries as 
they advance towards EU integration. This can be done by comparing the 
trade approach with the development approach, in a context of endogenous 
and exogenous competitive structures and pressures. The author∗ believes 
that the catching-up process is fundamentally determined by growth com-
petitiveness and business-environment competitiveness, as proxies respectively 
for the development and the trade approaches to convergence. A contrast is 
drawn between the convergence potential of CEE countries and the rather 
mechanistic measure of GDP per capita convergence. Some industries and 
categories of labour have converged rapidly towards the EU development 
standard, but others have not. On a macroeconomic level, the higher the 
endogenous competitive pressures derived from the business environment, the 
higher the speed of CEE countries’ GDP per capita convergence. Institutional 
quality, microeconomic reforms, national business environment, FDI, foreign 
trade and technology upgrading are all part of the story. Improvement in 
them is indispensable if post-communist countries are to catch up. The com-
plex interactions between them when determining Romania’s convergence 
speed are unexplored economic frameworks, and the study sets out to re-
flect on them. The argument for this approach rests on the need to give 
due weight to the fact that a country’s wealth or standard of living is cre-
ated at microeconomic level, and interactions between growth and trade 
performance (competitiveness) reveal in transition economies complex pat-
terns that provide in-depth explanations for convergence-speed differences. 
Macroeconomic, political, legal and social reforms cannot entirely succeed 
unless such capabilities improve. The paper also makes several comments on 
the CEE 10 framework for the trade liberalization/economic growth/human 
development relationship, in the context of EU integration. Finally, the author 
puts forward a new composite indicator for convergence, to limit the uncer-
tainty of classical convergence approaches and growth projections for CEE 
countries. This Growth Competitiveness Convergence indicator takes into ac-
count the neglected aspects of the convergence process already mentioned, 
and changes the overall picture of CEE convergence performance. 
                                                 
∗ Andreea Vass, Institute of National Economy, Romanian Academy of Sciences, Bucharest 
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INTRODUCTION 
The speed and intensity of change in the 
CEE countries led to a historic challenge 
in May 2004: integration of eight CEE 
and two Mediterranean economies into 
the EU, the world’s biggest trade bloc. It 
happened at a time when the EU faced 
many difficulties with achieving the Lis-
bon Agenda of gaining the lead by 2010 
in the knowledge-based economy. The EU 
strongly suggested as part of the Copen-
hagen criteria for accession that appli-
cants should have a ‘functioning market 
economy’, able to withstand the competi-
tive pressures of the European internal 
market. This reality has to be met by all 
transition economies aspiring to full EU 
membership. In addition to these external 
competitive forces, they face strong do-
mestic competitive pressures from the 
structural and socio-political changes they 
are undergoing. 
The first aim of the paper is to see 
why the process of transformation and 
convergence to the EU has been so un-
even in Romania, as compared with 
other candidate countries. Evaluating the 
challenges and opportunities for Romania 
to reach acceptable levels of performance 
among EU newcomers will help to reveal 
the forces holding it back. An obviously 
important policy objection in the acceding 
countries is to speed up economic 
growth. This is still a serious problem, 
as success has been scarce and resources 
are too limited. Convergence certainly 
cannot be taken for granted. However, 
what turns out to provide a real ex-
planatory dimension is to analyse the 
speed of convergence of CEE countries 
advancing towards EU integration, ob-
tained by contrasting the development 
approach with the trade approach, in 
the context of endogenous and exoge-
nous competitive structures and pres-
sures. Beyond issues of industrial spe-
cialization, productivity gaps, labour 
market distortions and foreign invest-
ments, there are unexplored economic 
factors to reflect upon. The ones that 
can secure or impede economic develop-
ment and the catching-up process in-
clude microeconomic reforms, national 
business environment, quality of public 
institutions, and technology upgrading. 
The argument for this approach rests on 
the important fact that a nation’s wealth 
or standard of living is created at mi-
croeconomic level. Interactions between 
growth and trade performance (competi-
tiveness) reveal complex patterns that 
further explain higher or lower speeds 
of CEE convergence to the EU. Unless 
such capabilities improve, macroeco-
nomic, political, legal and social reforms 
cannot fully succeed. 
This paper also provides insights 
into the CEE framework of the relation-
ship of trade liberalization, economic 
growth and human development, in the 
context of the EU integration process. It 
will examine (i) the economic and institu-
tional mechanisms of trade/growth/hu-
man development links in transition 
economies, (ii) whether trade liberaliza-
tion has benefited growth and human 
development in these, (iii) whether 
liberalization improved income distribu-
tion, and (iv) whether the massive learn-
ing effects of trade have helped to close 
the development gap with the EU over 
the last decade, or whether the CEE 
countries remain tied to traditional input-
cost comparative advantages. 
Finally, this approach is aimed at 
deeper analysis of the driving forces be-
hind convergence, which lead to design-
ing a new composite indicator of con-
vergence, to limit the uncertainty of clas-
sical convergence approaches and growth 
projections for CEE countries. This 
Growth Competitiveness Convergence in-
dex reflects the author’s belief that both 
growth theory and past experience of 
previous enlargements offer many les-
sons, but they cannot guide in any eco-
nomically robust manner assessment of 
the likely economic consequences of CEE 
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integration into the EU. There are many 
differences deriving from the transition 
process from a planned economy to a 
market-based one. These concern the CEE 
countries, which are undergoing difficult 
economic reforms irrespective of their 
efforts to join the EU. Furthermore, the 
catching-up process is determined by 
growth competitiveness and business en-
vironment competitiveness as proxies for 
development, rather than by the alterna-
tive trade approach to convergence. 
There are some inherent tensions between 
the convergence potential of CEE coun-
tries and the trade context. The higher 
the endogenous competitive pressures de-
rived from the business environment, the 
higher the rate of the CEE countries’ 
GDP per capita convergence to the EU. 
Institutional quality, FDI, foreign trade 
and technology are all part of this, and 
indispensable to the catching-up process, 
as they drive economic and social 
growth in the current stage of competi-
tive development, which involves strug-
gling to upgrade efficiency. 
Chapter 1 reviews the international 
literature on convergence methodologies 
and puts forward the main findings and 
limitations on driving forces for growth 
in the CEE 10 (the eight new EU mem-
bers plus Romania and Bulgaria). It also 
explains the theoretical arguments for 
linking the trade and development ap-
proaches on convergence and the role of 
specialization. Chapter 2 sets out the 
empirical findings for the analytical 
scheme, with special attention to Roma-
nia’s economic performance and conver-
gence in a comparative framework, with 
CEE countries and with European lag-
gards and other emerging countries 
(used for benchmarking). Chapter 3 ex-
plains how the Growth Competitiveness 
Convergence index is built up and com-
pares the results with existing views. It 
also builds scenarios for CEE catching 
up, estimating the years needed to reach 
the EU average level. 
LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 
Current convergence ap-
proaches 
In evaluating the speed and timing of 
CEE convergence to the EU, the extensive 
international literature operates with real 
GDP per capita levels adjusted for pur-
chasing power as a proxy for living 
standards. Empirically, two different 
techniques have been employed to meas-
ure convergence: ß-convergence (the re-
sult of higher rates of growth in poorer 
countries than in rich countries) and s-
convergence (decrease in the degree of 
dispersion in income levels). Most empiri-
cal studies on growth and convergence 
in transition economies use a neoclassical 
growth-accounting framework. (This is 
either unconditional – in considering two 
countries with the same fundamental pa-
rameters, the country with a higher level 
of GDP per capita must have a lower 
productivity of capital and therefore 
grow at a lower rate than the country 
with a lower level of GDP per capita – 
or conditional – countries allowed to dif-
fer in such parameters can still converge 
after controlling for these.) The weak-
nesses of this are addressed in alterna-
tive approaches, stressing the importance 
of technological change and congruence, 
and of social capability, in explaining 
economic growth and the catching-up 
process (Abramovitz 1993). The former 
constraint derives from the fact that any 
technology is defined by differences in 
the use of natural resources and other 
factors of production, by differing de-
grees of economies of scale, and by re-
quirements of differing technological 
abilities. (Thus countries behind the tech-
nological frontier find it difficult to catch 
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up with the leader unless they have 
characteristics that conform to the pre-
vailing technology.) The latter refers to 
education, financial institutions, infra-
structures, the political and social envi-
ronment, and all elements that can fa-
vour or limit the ability of countries to 
exploit their growth potential. 
To these key economic issues have 
been added other approaches for evalu-
ating the major economic implications of 
EU enlargement on the catching up of 
the accession economies: (i) reform poli-
cies, shaped by the competitive forces of 
EU enlargement agreements and EU ac-
quis communautaire (Young and Wallace 
2000; Funck 2002; Backe 2002); (ii) the 
public sector, including fiscal transfers to 
new members as a direct consequence of 
EU membership (Breuss 2001; Kopits and 
Székely 2002; Funck 2002; Backe 2002; 
Richter 2003); labour markets and social 
policies (Barro 1991; Stehrer et al. 1999; 
Sinn et al. 2001; Boeri et al. 2002; Ing-
ham et al. 2002; Sinn and Ochel 2003; 
Landesmann and Stehrer 2004); (iii) FDI 
(Buch 1999; Resmini 2000; Alessandrini 
2000; Altomonte and Resmini 2001; 
Breuss 2001; Hunya 2002; Backe 2002; 
Carkovic and Levine 2002; Sinn 2003; 
Landesmann and Stehrer 2004); (iv) ef-
fects of schooling (Mankiw et al. 1992; 
Bassanini and Scarpeta 2001; Landes-
mann 2003); (v) productivity and struc-
tural changes (Bernard and Jones 1996; 
Stehrer et al. 1999; Midelfart-Knarvik et 
al. 2000; Kopits and Szekely 2003; Ing-
ham and Ingham 2002; Funck 2002; 
Römisch 2003; Landesmann 2003; Lukas 
and Pöschl 2003; Havlik 2003); (vi) 
common currency-area growth effects 
(Persson 2001; Rose 2000 and 2001; 
Micco et al. 2003). (Table 1) 
The main findings are generally supported: 
1. On the whole, the accession countries 
have been growing faster than most 
EU 15 countries, so that convergence 
has appeared and should continue af-
ter enlargement in the context of full 
integration (Baldwin et al. 1997; 
Fischer et al. 1998a; Breuss 2001; 
Fidrmuc et al. 2002; Tondl and Vuk-
sic 2003; Kaitila 2004; Wagner and 
Hlouskova 2004). Almost all acceding 
CEE countries have recorded wider 
cyclical fluctuations than the EU, re-
flecting high investment ratios, so that 
a catching-up process of incomes is 
likely to persist. This leads to the view 
of an EU-25 being more heterogene-
ous with respect to economic growth.  
2. Significant differences appear in reap-
ing the gains from closer integration 
with the EU. GDP disparities are per-
sistent despite integration through for-
eign trade, FDI, migration and mas-
sive transfers of pre-accession funds 
to poorer regions. This has applied at 
EU regional level since the structural 
funds reform in 1989. A core-
periphery pattern is therefore relevant 
to describing the spatial distribution of 
activities in the EU (Lopez-Bazo et al. 
1999; Le Gallo and Ertur 2003; 
Dall’erba 2003) and at CEE level 
(Herz and Vogel 2003). Regional spill-
over effects were also detected (Rey 
and Montouri 1999; Fingleton 2001b; 
Niebuhr 2001; Kosfeld et al. 2002). 
3. GDP per capita is higher in more lib-
eralized countries, in regions close to 
the EU border and in those with high 
levels of education (Fidrmuc 2000; 
Campos and Kinoshita 2002; Tondl 
and Vuksic 2003). So investments, 
participation rates, technology transfer 
and innovation activity were found to 
be the main economic explanatory 
variables for the CEE countries’ per 
capita incomes and productivity-
growth gaps. This issue is returned to 
when the determinants for inducing a 
positive spiral of growth are ex-
plained. (Table 2) 
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Table 1 
Main convergence estimation methodologies used for measuring the economic gap between 
candidate countries and the EU average 
 
 Indicators as proxy 
Economic bases of the convergence meth-
odology Observations 
Solow 
(1956) 
GDP/head Estimates of GDP/head that converge on 
the country steady-state value, based on 
three driving forces: technical progress 
and the accumulation of two factors of 
production: labour and capital 
This is the standard neoclassical 
growth model, with very strong, 
mechanistic assumptions that do not 
predict absolute convergence.  
Mankiw et 
al. (1992) 
GDP/head 
at steady-
state value 
Unconditional convergence: based on the 
hypothesis that countries share the same 
steady state if they have identical eco-
nomic structures and differ only in their 
initial conditions. This is the hypothesis 
of absolute temporal convergence. Con-
ditional convergence: based on the hy-
pothesis of similar growth rates of out-
put and capital, if the countries have 
the same technology and same popula-
tion growth rates, but different propen-
sities to save and initial capital-labour 
ratios. 
This over-simplifies the economic 
growth reality, being heavily criti-
cized on theoretical and methodo-
logical grounds, such as heterogene-
ity, endogeny and measurement 
problems. To sum up, there is not 
just one steady state, to which all 
economies converge. There may be 
multiple, locally stable, steady-state 
equilibria.  
Barro and 
Sala-i-
Martin 
(1992, 
1995) 
GDP/head They define ß-convergence as the nega-
tive correlation between the initial 
GDP/head level and annual growth 
rates, and s-convergence as the spatial 
distribution of GDP/head. 
This provides reliable ex-post evalua-
tions for economies in the same 
geographical area, but these meth-
odologies do not offer solutions for 
economically robust projections. 
Ben-David 
and Rah-
man (1996) 
Pelkman 
(2002) 
GDP growth Trade induced-growth simulation: con-
vergence occurs because of factor-price 
competition according to the Heckscher-
Ohlin theory of international trade and 
because of trade-related convergence in 
technologies. Countries that trade exten-
sively tend to converge more. 
Sectoral approaches based on strong 
or relaxed assumptions (static ef-
fects; dynamic effects). The models 
face similar problems to the Solow 
and Mankiw Neoclassical: too fo-
cused on capital and labour, tech-
nology being exogenous; endogeny 
not addressed; demand side ignored 
(helping to explain FDI, ‘imitation’ 
etc.). Neither helps explain the con-
vergence process in the modern 
world. 
Tondl and 
Vuksic 
(2003) 
GDP/head They use a growth-accounting frame-
work and focus especially on the role 
of economic geography. The main driv-
ing forces that may explain the different 
catching-up speeds are identified as FDI, 
geographical location near EU border, 
and higher education. 
Regional growth clusters are identi-
fied from simple models of economic 
growth, using spatial econometric 
tools. 
Herz and 
Vogel 
(2003) 
GDP/head 
and gross-
value added 
per capita 
and per 
employee 
They also use a growth-accounting 
framework and suggest that structural 
factors, e.g. rate of labour participation, 
share of agriculture and manufacturing 
in total employment, and level of educa-
tion, are relevant for regional growth 
performance in the first years of transi-
tion, but these explanatory variables 
weaken in later years.  
Results from a cross-section of re-
gions are compared with results 
from time-series analysis (two sub-
periods: 1991–1996, 1996–2002) and 
with panel estimates. They do not 
provide strong variables to explain 
the variation in income or produc-
tivity growth in the period 1996–
2002. 
Le Gallo 
and 
Dall’erba 
(2003) 
GDP/head They build a general framework for 
testing simultaneously for temporal in-
stability, spatial heterogeneity and spatial 
auto-correlation in ß-convergence mod-
els. 
They find temporal and spatial in-
terdependence in the convergence 
process, but the problem of projec-
tions is unsolved. 
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 Indicators as proxy 
Economic bases of the convergence meth-
odology Observations 
Wagner 
and 
Hlouskova 
(2004) 
GDP/head They prove that the Neoclassical growth 
determinants are not relevant for 
growth convergence in the transition 
economies, and beside government con-
sumption share and investment share in 
GDP, they introduce more explanatory 
variables: primary school education and 
the average ratio of exports and im-
ports to GDP. They indirectly approach 
the structural changes and effects of 
upcoming EU membership. 
They address the problem of uncer-
tainty in the growth projections, 
building several scenarios for the 
growth rate and convergence time 
distributions. The problem of linear-
ity in the convergence approximation 
remains unsolved. (This points in the 
end to richer CEE countries than the 
EU.) 
Landesmann 
and Stehrer 
(2004) 
 They develop a multi-country, multi-
sector Schumpeterian model of interna-
tional specialization and catching up, 
following up the impact of rent-seeking 
FDI, speed of technology transfer, pro-
ductivity growth and the migration 
flows. 
They overcome some theoretical limi-
tations of traditional literature on 
dynamic economic effects of increas-
ing integration (e.g. specialization, 
demand-side catching-up patterns, 
FDI endogenization), but provide no 
empirical tests.  
European 
Commission 
(regular 
enlargement 
reports) 
Usually 
GDP/head 
and labour 
costs 
They have a set of individual indicators, 
but they are not aggregated. 
These do not quantify the structural 
convergence, but enlarge on the es-
sential structural challenges. 
Deutsche 
Bank (an-
nual re-
ports 
2000–2004) 
Deutsche 
Bank Re-
search Con-
vergence 
Indicator 
Four main criteria: status of accession 
negotiations/political economy: private 
sector/GDP (per cent); legal system 
(EBRD); governance (EBRD); banking 
sector (EBRD); trade and foreign-
exchange market liberalization (EBRD); 
structural convergence (real economic 
convergence: economic, legal and institu-
tional developments): GDP/head (euro 
and euro PPP); GDP nominal (euro); 
GDP growth (per cent p.a.); invest-
ment/GDP (per cent); productivity 
growth (per cent); unemployment (per 
cent); agriculture/GDP (per cent); indus-
try/GDP (per cent); external sector: cur-
rent account balance/GDP (per cent); 
FDI/GDP (per cent); trade integration, 
per cent of exports EMU convergence 
(monetary and fiscal convergence): aver-
age consumer prices (per cent p.a.); 
gross monthly wages (euro); government 
expenditure/GDP (per cent); fiscal bal-
ance/GDP (per cent); general govern-
ment debt/GDP (per cent); 
This represents the first attempt to 
assess structural convergence of the 
accession countries. The results re-
flect an over-simplification of the 
adjustments undertaken in the field 
of economic, legal, regulatory and 
other institutional aspects. Though it 
is highly informative, it does not 
highlight clearly countries’ economic 
strengths and weaknesses in terms 
of competitiveness, according to the 
Copenhagen accession criteria. Nor 
is the potential for prosperity and 
catching up derived from business-
sector quality and competitiveness. 
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Further changes in growth and wel-
fare in the eight CEE entrants will be 
triggered by de jure integration into the 
EU, although these changes have partly 
taken place before accession. Full EU 
membership will contribute to improving 
economic growth through (i) traditional 
trade effects of economic integration 
(trade creation and trade diversion), de-
pendent partly on the ability of current 
member countries to react quickly to 
changes in relative goods and factor 
prices that come with trade liberalization, 
and (ii) movements of factors of produc-
tion and other dynamic effects (e.g. capi-
tal export/import, technology transfer, 
increased competition, economies of 
scale). 
There appear to be some differ-
ences in the evaluations of magnitude 
and speed of convergence in the last 
decade, explainable by differences in 
data availability, data accuracy, or 
methodology used in estimations associ-
ated with more or less mechanistic as-
sumptions. Wagner and Hlouskova 
(2004) point out in their growth projec-
tion that the heterogeneous levels of de-
velopment in the CEE 10 are essentially 
unrelated economically: they reflect the 
assumption of systemic convergence on 
the EU as being towards a ‘statistical 
mean country’ of the sample taken into 
consideration (EU 15).  
Finding the magic solution to un-
derstanding the growth mechanisms of 
catch-up economies has proved very dif-
ficult. Questions such as the causes of 
differing growth performance in CEE 
countries have been addressed by many 
researchers. Some investigate the main 
growth determinants using large world-
wide country sets (Sachs and Warner 
1995; Sala-i-Martin 1997; Gallup et al. 
1998; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1998; 
Rodrick 2002; Doppelhofer et al. 2004; 
Blanke et al. 2004) or EU regional coun-
try sets (Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996, 
Table 2
Empirical evidence on the speed of convergence of the accession countries and the EU 
 
 Convergence   refers to: Convergence speed Observations 
Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) 
GDP/head 2 per cent Ex-post and ex-ante analysis regarding the av-
erage annual convergence speed in EU. 
Breuss (2001) GDP growth over 
10 years 
< 1 per cent Simulation based on world macroeconomic 
model. 
Doyle et al. (2001) 
European Commis-
sion (2001) 
GDP/head 1-2 per cent Simulation using growth-accounting methodol-
ogy. 
Pelkman (2002) Trade-induced 
GDP growth 
1½–8 per cent of 
GDP  
Simulation for short to medium term, for CEE 
as a group after enlargement. 
Wagner and 
Hlouskova (2002) 
GDP/head 3–4 decades for 
catching up 
Estimate of EU historical convergence applied to 
newcomer countries. 
Sinn and Ochel 
(2003) 
GDP/head 1.1 per cent Period: 1963–2000, for EU. 
European Commis-
sion (2003) 
GDP growth 0.4–1.2 per cent Increase induced by EU structural funds’ pay-
ments to CEE countries. 
Kaitila (2004) GDP/head 2.6 per cent 3.4 
per cent 
Period: 1960–2001, for EU. Period: 1995–2001 
for CEE 7. 
Wagner and 
Hlouskova (2004) 
GDP/head  1.74 per cent, 
3.05–3.52 per cent
Period: 1990–2001, for EU 14 (ex Luxem-
bourg). These are individual mean growth rate 
projections for CEE 10 based on scenarios and 
applying EU historical convergence rate, includ-
ing the effect of EU enlargement related to 
structural funds payments.  
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Vanhoudt et al. 2000; Paci and Pigliaru 
2001; Badinger and Tondl 2003). As re-
gards CEE countries, the studies investi-
gating multiple growth factors at country 
level can be divided into those derived 
from initial conditions, which particularly 
explain the factors of increased economic 
growth during the transition and recov-
ery period, and those related to the fac-
tors relevant to post-transition dynamic 
growth. 
1. Analysis of initial conditions in transi-
tion economies, derived from the nature 
of the communist institutional system, 
remains the aim of a huge international 
literature. The common features are in-
tensified by different systemic pressures 
at national level, in terms of degree of 
extensive controls exerted by the com-
munist state, associated with an over-
grown communist welfare state and with 
the provision of public goods. These dif-
ferences may provide valuable explana-
tions for different development paths and 
economic performance, but do not alone 
explain different speeds of convergence 
on the EU.  
Few people today disagree with 
this, although it merely shifts the ques-
tion to what the central determinants of 
a success story are. Hernández-Cáta 
(1997), Fisher et al. (1998a), Piazzolo 
(1999) and Falcetti et al. (2002) focus 
on institutional reform and market liber-
alization as major explanatory variables. 
Berg and Sahay (1999) consider that dif-
ferences in structural reforms explain 
these differences and that the role of 
initial conditions in explaining cross-
sectional variation in growth is surpris-
ingly minor. Havrylyshyn and van 
Rooden (2000) and Barlow and 
Radulescu (2002) identify progress in 
achieving macroeconomic stabilization 
and implementing broad-based economic 
reforms the main driving forces of 
growth. In addition, suggests that the 
more and the faster the reforms, the 
better their outcomes are. Balcerowicz 
(2003) stresses that differing perform-
ances of transition economies are due 
less to initial conditions than to differ-
ences in quality of general policies (hori-
zontal: privatization, prudent regulation 
and supervision, protection of creditors’ 
and minority shareholders’ rights, re-
structuring of bad debts) and sectoral 
policies (privatization, soft/hard budget 
constraints on enterprises).  
However, the negative effects of 
unfavourable initial conditions decline 
over time (DeMelo et al. 1997; Berg et 
al. 1999) and cannot serve as an excuse 
for inaction or lagging behind. Such ef-
fects can be offset by modestly faster 
progress on reforms.  
The main negative outcome of ini-
tial conditions is to lower political will 
and capacity for reform, which obviously 
translates into lower economic growth 
and competitiveness in terms of govern-
ance and business development. A com-
prehensive empirical model built by Sachs 
and McArthur (2001) summarizes the set 
of institutions, policies and structures 
that drive the growth process, in three 
interconnected pillars: macroeconomic en-
vironment, public institutions and the 
level of technological sophistication. With 
transition economies, public institutions 
and organizational efficiency play a more 
crucial role in the development process 
than they do in highly developed coun-
tries.  
To sum up, all the explanations of 
economic growth are largely ‘institution-
alist’, although exogenous to the models 
that estimate the convergence process 
specified above. They themselves need 
further explanation and endogenization.  
2. A number of studies address the cen-
tral post-transition growth determinants, 
such as capital accumulation, productiv-
ity growth, FDI, labour force participa-
tion, educational attainment, technology 
transfer and innovation or geography 
location in the EU border area (Fidrmuc 
2000; Boeri and Brücker 2000; Alto-
monte and Resmini 2001; Dobrinski 
2001; Campos and Kinoshita 2002; Tondl 
and Vuksic 2003; Herz and Vogel 2003; 
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Landesmann and Stehrer 2004). The 
main empirical findings reveal the high 
importance of FDI, followed by geo-
graphical location and higher levels of 
education (as main drivers for further 
technology diffusion), in leading the 
stronger performance of some countries 
after 1995. A variable like FDI is not 
exclusively exogenous in explaining 
higher economic growth, but partly en-
dogenous. Its determinants, such as 
market size or wealth, cheap labour or 
highly educated work force, have to be 
considered. Increased capital accumula-
tion is far less important than it was 
with the developed countries or less ad-
vanced economies that joined the EU in 
the 1980s. This suggests that applying 
their speed of convergence as criteria for 
convergence among the new members is 
inappropriate. Analysis of the catching-up 
process must rely on the specific features 
of the transition economies and be ad-
dressed in a different way for the two 
periods and the two sets of countries. 
These views are in line with the 
findings of two recent papers (Herz and 
Vogel 2003; Wagner and Hlouskova 
2004). The former accounts for regional 
economic growth convergence during 
transition by investigating the dynamics 
of regional disparities in gross value 
added per capita and per employee. 
Comparing results from the cross-section 
of regions for two sub-periods, 1991–6 
and 1996–2002, they conclude that the 
pronounced reduction in regional dispari-
ties is largely attributable to income con-
vergence. This trend applies in the first 
years of transition, but thereafter, the 
regional pattern of disparities remained 
stable. Their empirical findings reject un-
conditional convergence for the three CEE 
countries analysed here (the Czech Re-
public, Hungary and Poland – account-
ing for two-thirds of CEE GDP and more 
than 50 per cent of the population), but 
they find evidence for conditional con-
vergence – poorer regions conditionally 
grow faster than richer. Their results 
further suggest that structural factors 
such as the rate of labour participation, 
the share of agriculture and manufactur-
ing in total employment, and the level of 
education, are relevant to regional 
growth performance. Splitting the sample 
into the two sub-periods mentioned sug-
gested that conditional convergence is a 
phenomenon typical of the first half of 
the 1990s but not the second. The vari-
ables used to explain the variation in 
income or productivity growth substan-
tially weaken in the period 1996–2002. 
Also found is a strong influence from 
country characteristics. Regional dispari-
ties between countries have diminished, 
whereas on average, they have remained 
stable within countries (Herz and Vogel 
2003). 
The ‘new growth’ set of factors 
does not provide an adequate explana-
tion of the growth patterns in the CEE 
10, but they become increasingly impor-
tant as the economy passes beyond the 
transition period. In 1991–5, a negative 
correlation between initial real per capita 
GDP and subsequent growth (ß-
convergence) prevails. The correlation 
between investment share and output 
growth is negative (though insignificant) 
and that between government expendi-
tures and output growth is positive. But 
ß-convergence and both the above-
mentioned correlations disappear when 
the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia are excluded from CEE 10. The 
following years, 1995–2001, show a simi-
lar picture, but it is associated with a 
positive correlation between investment 
share and output growth. Thus the tran-
sition behaviours are not consistent with 
the long-term implications of neoclassical 
growth models (Wagner and Hlouskova 
2004). 
In Romania’s case and Bulgaria’s, 
displaying these two sets of factors sug-
gests that a growth-convergence projec-
tion would have to weight them differ-
ently. For example, a negative correlation 
between FDI flows and changes in GDP 
persists in Romania in 1995–2001 
(Voinea 2002a). Further systemic change 
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and other transitional transformations 
should continue up to 2007, when Ro-
mania is expected to join the EU. There-
after, the convergence trend will be 
shaped by effects of EU accession and 
the gains for the national business envi-
ronment from integration into the single 
market. This ‘calibration approach’ 
geared to phasing of structural change 
is a key question to be addressed. 
Linking trade and develop-
ment in the process of com-
peting for economic growth 
In macroeconomics, trade theory and 
growth theory have mainly developed as 
separate disciplines. The primary aim of 
the first is to explain the direction and 
magnitude of trade flows between na-
tions, while growth theory tries to ex-
plain the rate of growth in the wealth of 
nations and the magnitude of conver-
gence or divergence of GDP growth 
rates over time. When economists seek to 
explain the growth performance of a 
firm, a crucial explanatory factor is the 
way it competes in the markets for its 
products. Obviously, there is a direct 
relation between market (trade) perform-
ance and growth. In the modern world 
of increasingly important international 
relations, however, the markets for firms 
are no longer exclusively domestic. Since 
the growth performance of a country is 
determined by the performance of its 
firms, it is clear that theories of interna-
tional trade and international growth 
cannot be viewed as separate entities. 
Since there is a relationship be-
tween trade and growth, there are a 
number of factors well known from 
trade theory that enter into analysis of 
economic growth: competitiveness, the 
exchange rate, terms of trade, and elas-
ticity of demand with regard to income 
and price. These factors and their role 
in the growth process have been dis-
cussed at length by Krugman, Obstfeld, 
de Grauw, Krueger, Bhagwati, Hoekman 
and many others, and transformed into 
the so-called import-substitution industri-
alization strategy of development (ISI) 
implemented by many countries in the 
1950s–1970s; or the export promotion 
strategy later known also as the out-
ward-oriented strategy (OES). This gained 
popularity first among academics, and 
then quickly among policy-makers in de-
veloping countries, from the 1980s on-
wards. Political economists such as Wade 
argue there is no simple choice between 
ISI and OES. The most successful Asian 
developers have used both, at various 
times. In any case, many economists no-
tice that despite centuries-old ideas of 
trade as an engine of growth, recent 
decades have still been characterized by 
protectionist theories and practice. De-
spite the globalization process, national 
or regional economies organize them-
selves in various ways and have diverse 
expectations of their governments and 
market players. The struggle to impose 
the rules of the free foreign trade game 
on the new global economy, especially in 
the EU integration process, is drawn 
from the concept of ‘fair trade’. The be-
haviour of national markets in the global 
competition battle proves to be to erect 
technical barriers to restrict unfair trade. 
These sometimes become protectionist 
trade instruments, detrimental to the 
original intentions. The domestic con-
straints imposed by regionalization and 
globalization lead to compensation 
through these trade instruments, some-
times overwhelming the competitive ad-
vantage of others, and implicitly, the po-
tential for economic growth and wellbe-
ing. 
Export-led growth or growth-led 
exports? The focus of debate nowadays 
has switched from how biased export-led 
growth strategy is to the causal relation-
ship between exports and growth. 
Clearly, ‘Trade has been a friend of 
economic development and growth, not 
an enemy, as many policymakers and 
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economists feared in the immediate post-
war period’. It is far less clear whether 
a rise in exports was the main determi-
nant of growth or just one of its facili-
tators. The OECD examines in some de-
tail this relationship between exports and 
growth, supporting the view that the 
strategies pursued in East Asian coun-
tries built up national internal competi-
tiveness, resulting in dynamic growth 
and then in increased supply of exports. 
In this sense, it is correct to talk of 
growth-led exports, not export-led 
growth. This interpretation draws on re-
cent developments in growth theories, 
focused on the roles in generating dy-
namic economic growth of increasing 
economies of scale, technology strategies, 
knowledge-absorption processes, and in-
vestment. This growth then induces rapid 
growth in exports of manufactures. 
Trade policy as an input to transi-
tion, specialization and convergence. A 
common ingredient of all transition pro-
grammes is early trade liberalization. The 
key role of trade liberalization in poten-
tial domestic economic impact may be 
found in price reform and competition 
policy, which push domestic producers 
towards maximum potential efficiency. 
From an external perspective, trade lib-
eralization is expected to upgrade the 
technological level of the economy, hope-
fully bringing higher exports that build 
up demand for domestic goods and de-
crease per capita income gaps. For tran-
sition countries, one of the main findings 
is that protection costs do not automati-
cally transfer into liberalization benefits 
(Venables 1999; Barry 2001). These are 
larger when (i) there is movement from 
high tariffs or other barriers to low 
ones, (ii) scale efficiency and technology 
improve in the presence of pro-
competitive effects, and (iii) there are 
opportunities to import new technolo-
gies/expertise that foster economic 
growth (import-led growth). 
The main effects of trade liberaliza-
tion can be expected in these areas: con-
sumers, producers, fiscal revenue (World 
Bank 1996), the labour market (Feenstra 
and Hanson 2001; Ghose 2003), the bal-
ance of payments (OECD reports), and 
international competitiveness through 
changes in composition of technological 
activities (Meliciani 2001; Landesmann 
and Stehrer 2004). The last, crucial to 
the specialization pattern of a catching-
up country, is addressed differently in 
three leading theories of trade and 
growth. 
In traditional Neoclassical growth 
theory, neither the opening of trade nor 
different patterns of specialization can 
affect countries’ rates of growth. This 
assumes a production function with con-
stant returns to scale and decreasing 
marginal product for any single factor 
of production. Consequently technical 
change is an exogenous process and 
there are no inter-country differences in 
production functions. So it is asserted 
that countries with a higher capi-
tal/labour ratio must have lower produc-
tivity of capital and lower growth rates 
compared with countries with lower 
capital/labour ratios. Neoclassical trade 
theories, in their simplest form, assume 
identical tastes and perfect competition, 
along with identical production functions, 
to prove that relative specialization oc-
curs in the relatively abundant factor 
endowments (the Heckscher–Ohlin theo-
rem). At the macroeconomic level, the 
Neoclassical theory of international trade 
stresses the role of adjustments in rela-
tive prices in restoring the balance-of-
payments equilibrium. As Eastern Europe 
is capital-poor but labour-rich, trade will 
induce a reduction of relative prices of 
labour-intensive goods along with real 
wages in the EU and labour to move out 
of these product groups into more capi-
tal-intensive ones. In the steady state, 
when output and capital grow at the 
same rate, the increase in per capita in-
come is explained only by exogenous 
technological progress. In this frame-
work, trade liberalization is beneficial to 
all countries and leads to specialization 
according to comparative advantage, not 
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to effects of economies of scale or learn-
ing opportunities. Thus no importance is 
given to what goods are produced (the 
effect of constant returns to scale and 
exogenous technological progress). 
Endogeny and/or appropriation of 
technical change (through imitation) may 
better assess the proper relationship be-
tween trade and growth (Meliciani 
2001). Three major theoretical ap-
proaches that shed useful light on the 
impact of specialization on growth and 
international competitiveness can be dis-
tinguished. (i) New growth and trade 
theory (Arrow, Krugman, Helpman, Sala-
i-Martin, Grossman, Romer, Young, Ma-
tsuyama, etc.) is a development of the 
Neoclassical approach that overcomes 
some of its main drawbacks (long-term 
growth dependency on unexplained tech-
nological change and the forecast of 
convergence in growth and per capita 
incomes). The effects of trade on growth 
are explained through economies of scale 
and more efficient resource allocation. 
The theory introduces monopolistic com-
petition, product differentiation and in-
creasing returns as explanations when 
trade that is not based on comparative 
advantage occurs. This approach has the 
power to explain intra-industry trade, 
trade within rather similar instead of 
different economies, the two-way trade in 
goods of similar factor intensity, and the 
foreign direct investments. However it is 
not completely satisfactory for assessing 
the role of specialization and technical 
change and omits the role of demand in 
affecting growth. (ii) Post-Keynesian mod-
els of growth (Harrod, Domar, Kaldor, 
Hufbauer) emphasize the importance of 
aggregate demand for growth, by reject-
ing the assumption that supply creates 
its own demand (Say’s Law). In other 
words, producing new goods in a mone-
tary economy may improve purchasing 
parity, but may not result in higher ex-
penditures. In the static framework, in-
vestments are the source of demand in-
crease that determines the level of out-
put. The dynamic framework accounts 
also for the feedback effect of output on 
investment (the accelerator mechanism), 
so that investment becomes an endoge-
nous variable. The role of trade in af-
fecting the rate of growth has been em-
phasized in export-led accounts of 
growth (Beckerman, Lamfalussy, Balassa, 
Thirlwall). The higher the income elastic-
ities for exports and the lower those for 
imports, the higher the rates of growth 
consistent with balance-of-payments equi-
librium (the main constraint on demand). 
The role of specialization patterns inter-
venes only in their influence on the in-
come elasticities of exports and imports, 
and technological differences across 
countries do not play an explicit role in 
explaining the gaps in economic per-
formance. The presence of increasing re-
turns also explains why convergence in 
per capita income and factor prices 
forecast by Neoclassical theory does not 
appear in reality. In this framework, the 
proper division of international trade is 
not so much the traditional one between 
capital-intensive and labour-intensive 
trade, but between low-wage and tech-
nology-led trade. So a multi-sectoral ap-
proach, taking into account sector-
specific elements of technical progress 
and demand, is a better approach to 
economic growth. Structural changes then 
play an important role in explaining the 
growth phenomenon. (iii) Schumpeterian–
evolutionary models (Schumpeter, Nelson, 
Winter, Dosi, Arthur, Silverberg, Free-
man, Perez, Fagerberg, Verspagen, 
Vernon) address technical change 
endogenously as the main factor driving 
economic growth, but seeing it as un-
evenly distributed through time and 
across firms, industries and countries. 
Technical change is tacit, firm specific 
and difficult to transfer. In this ap-
proach, the distribution of countries’ 
technological activities may affect national 
economic performance. The waves of de-
velopment are linked to specific emerging 
industries with very high rates of 
growth, exploiting clusters of related in-
novations. The other industries receive 
impulses generated by the most innova-
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tive ones, allowing them to expand pro-
duction through inter-sectoral links. The 
main advantages of this approach come 
from emphasizing the roles of history 
and irreversibility of economic environ-
ments, of continuous change, of strong 
uncertainty derived from technological 
progress involving discovery and crea-
tion, of diversity at micro level, and of 
the attempt to link macroeconomic phe-
nomena with non-optimizing microeco-
nomic behaviours as elements of eco-
nomic growth. At the same time it deals 
with creative destruction and rejects the 
concept of the production function in 
any simple way, and along with that the 
tools of equilibrium analysis, replacing 
the notion of equilibrium with a stable 
path of evolution, similar to the stability 
of system theory. In evolutionary models, 
even if the system is indeterminate and 
permanently out of equilibrium, order is 
generated by self-organization, through 
varying combinations of learning, selec-
tion mechanisms and institutional struc-
tures. 
2) ROMANIA’S CONVERGENCE 
ON THE EU IN A COMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVE 
The development approach to Ro-
mania’s convergence: starting point 
and current standing 
Why is it important to look again at the 
development path taken by Romania and 
compare it with other countries’? With 
the CEE 10, one cannot speak of a con-
vergence club – a group of economies 
whose initial conditions are near enough 
to converge on the same long-term 
equilibrium. Regional economies are often 
marked by strong geographical patterns, 
such as core-periphery (Le Gallo and 
Dall’erba 2003). The latter is representa-
tive of spatial heterogeneity – instability 
of macroeconomic behaviour in space. It 
should be added that firms’ behaviour 
varies as well, as they act differently ac-
cording to knowledge base, accumulated 
experience, and entrepreneurial spirit. 
This leads to microeconomic heterogeneity 
that induces higher or lower economic 
growth, according to changes in the 
competitiveness of the business environ-
ment. It correlates highly with organiza-
tional and social change, as it depends 
also on the reaction of the ambient insti-
tutional framework. 
The growth process of the transi-
tion economies started with a transfor-
mational recession causing drastic falls in 
output, high unemployment and often 
hyper-inflation (Kornai 1994; Traistaru 
and Wolff 2002; Wagner and Hlouskova 
2002; Campos and Coricelli 2002). Here 
any growth convergence analysis must 
consider the driving forces of (i) the 
country’s place in the picture of the 
complex transition process (usually in-
volving institutionalist approaches identi-
fied earlier) and (ii) the determinants of 
growth (usually identified by the new 
Neoclassical growth theory in the long 
run.) 
Macroeconomic environment 
The initial conditions and ensuing out-
comes in terms of economic structures, 
economic performance, infrastructure 
and human development are presented 
synthetically, underlining the main gaps 
between Romania (coloured red), the EU 
(coloured black) and other candidate 
countries (coloured blue). Also used for 
benchmarking are Asian or Latin Ameri-
can emerging economies, less advanced 
European economies, and other CIS tran-
sition economies (coloured green). 
The development paths of the ex-
communist countries have differed con-
siderably in various respects. Romania’s 
increased speed of industrialization in the 
1960s and 1970s, associated with mas-
sive technology imports from the West, 
did not achieve its efficiency targets. In 
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terms of industrial over total employment 
(Figure A.1.1) and value added in indus-
try as a proportion of GDP in 1989 
(Figure A.1.2), Romania’s degree of in-
dustrialization compared with that of 
former Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, but 
exceeded that of other transition econo-
mies and even of other comparable 
emerging economies or of the Euro zone. 
Hungary outperformed all other CEE 
countries in 1992–2001 in terms of 
catching up in industrial productivity 
(Figure A.1.3). These two figures indicate 
a positive ß-coefficient of productivity 
convergence, in accordance with the 
well-known Gerschenkron hypothesis of 
‘advantage of backwardness’ at industrial 
level. (The technologically lagging country 
experiences higher rates of productivity 
growth in industries that start with a 
higher initial productivity gap, relative to 
the leader.) Romania’s performance is 
similar in relative terms to Estonia’s and 
the Czech Republic’s. 
The extensive industrialization proc-
ess was still associated with a large ag-
ricultural sector. Romania in 1989 had 
the largest agricultural sector in terms 
of employment share (Figure A.1.4) and 
followed Lithuania in terms of value 
added in agriculture as a percentage of 
GDP (Figure A.1.5). This proportion was 
comparable with China’s, but much lar-
ger than Chile’s or Mexico’s. These fig-
ures indicate that agricultural productiv-
ity (value added/employment in agricul-
ture) relative to overall productivity (total 
employment/GDP) was significantly higher 
in Romania (0.85) than in transition 
economies (Slovakia 0.69; Bulgaria 0.57; 
Poland 0.52; Czech Republic 0.50) other 
than Baltic States (Estonia 1; Lithuania 
and Latvia more than 1), and even in 
the Euro zone (0.5) or other bench-
marked emerging countries (Korea 0.5; 
Chile 0.47; China 0.43; Mexico 0.34; 
Thailand 0.22). 
One outcome of the communist in-
dustrialization policies of the 1960s and 
1970s was steadily increasing foreign 
debt. After the second worldwide oil 
shock, Romania’s was the only commu-
nist regime to make extensive efforts to 
repay its whole foreign debt, at the cost 
of lagging behind in the infant process 
of economic liberalization. So the norm 
in 1980s Romania was an annual for-
eign-trade surplus between USD 1 and 3 
billion, leading to very low foreign debt 
as a proportion of GDP in the pre-
transition years (Figure A.1.6) and rela-
tively low trade dependence on COMECON 
markets (Figure A.1.7).  
The main effects were severe com-
pression of domestic absorption, technol-
ogy obsolescence, virtually no major in-
vestment in modern infrastructures, and 
real isolation from developments in the 
outside world (Figure A.1.8). These ex-
plain the lower general government ex-
penditure relative to GDP (Figure A.1.9), 
particularly public expenditure on social 
security and welfare relative to GDP 
(Figure A.1.10), compared with 1989 fig-
ures for Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. Public 
expenditure on social security and wel-
fare comprises compensation for loss of 
income to the sick and temporarily dis-
abled; payments to the elderly, the per-
manently disabled, and the unemployed; 
family, maternity, and child allowances; 
and the cost of welfare services, such as 
care of the aged, the disabled, and chil-
dren. This category approximates social 
transfers but excludes transfers in edu-
cation and health. Nevertheless, govern-
ment expenditure shares are tricky indi-
cators. Some Neoclassical economists 
would see them as ‘crowding out’ pri-
vate expenditures and therefore assume 
strongly negative effects from these indi-
cators. A similar ambiguity is suggested 
by the substantial country variation be-
tween the models of fiscal transition in 
the following decade. They range from 
the Irish model – Hungary, Estonia and 
Latvia, increasing the share of govern-
ment expenditure in GDP – to the col-
lapse-of-the-state model – Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Lithuania – by decreasing this share. In 
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2001, the share of public expenditure on 
social security and welfare in GDP in 
Romania was similar to that in Hungary 
and Estonia and much smaller than that 
in Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria 
or Latvia.  
To the survey of main economic 
structural developments should be added 
that the transition economies varied 
widely in their macroeconomic imbal-
ances. Romania registered the lowest an-
nual inflation rate in 1989 (Figure A.2.1), 
which was associated with the highest 
repressed inflation rate in 1987–1990, 
estimated as the difference between the 
increase in real wages and real GDP 
from 1987 to 1990 (Figure A.2.2). In 
2002, Romania was a laggard in com-
bating inflation: an inflation rate four 
times higher than in Bulgaria or other 
accession countries, ranked it in first 
place for its Maastricht convergence-
criteria gap (Figure A.2.3). During the 
gradual price liberalization, Romanian 
monetary policy relied constantly until 
1997 on the exchange rate as an infla-
tion anchor. Afterwards, for only short 
periods of time (seasonal or trade-cycle 
shocks, e.g. imports of energy resources) 
did the necessity of controlling the trade 
balance and current-account deficit per-
mit any easing of exchange-rate policy 
used as a nominal anchor.  
The financial sector in the transition 
economies developed at varying paces. 
On the one hand, the black-market pre-
mium as a proportion of the official ex-
change rate was much higher in Roma-
nia than in the CEE 8, which reflected 
strong overvaluation of the currency 
(Figure A.2.4). In the meantime, the real 
appreciation of the annual exchange rate 
during 1991–2002 was near to 5–6 per 
cent (Figure A.2.5), similar to that regis-
tered in Poland and higher than those in 
Hungary (2.5–4 per cent) or Slovenia 
(1.5–2 per cent) in the same period. An 
estimated average of 1.5 per cent under-
valuation of the effective real exchange 
rate from its equilibrium level (1992–
2003) should have improved external 
competitiveness by stimulating the price 
competitiveness of exports and diminish-
ing that of imports. This was the case in 
the last years of transition, but before 
1999, the imprudent pay policy associ-
ated with low labour productivity in-
duced a worsening of external competi-
tiveness. After 1999, despite appreciation 
of the real exchange rate, the external 
competitiveness improved, as the increase 
in productivity was higher relative to 
earnings. So the improvement in competi-
tiveness was mainly in labour-intensive 
industries.  
On the other hand, the private sec-
tor in most of these countries is heavily 
financed by domestic credit and the fi-
nancial sector is bank-dominated. A 
stock-market capitalization of 2.9 per 
cent and a low 7.8 per cent ratio of 
domestic credit to the private sector in 
GDP meant Romania was lagging far 
behind in the CEE 10 in 2001 (Figure 
A.2.6). The performance of the financial 
sector correlates highly with the enter-
prise sector, where Romania’s perform-
ance expresses hard budget constraints 
on enterprises and a slower process of 
privatization and restructuring of bad 
debt, coupled with a low share of for-
eign investment in a capital-poor econ-
omy. 
In the 13 years after the collapse 
of communism, CEE countries experi-
enced very diverse outcomes in terms of 
FDI attractiveness and economic growth. 
Romania was a constant laggard in cu-
mulative per capita FDI inflows in 1989–
2002 relative to the CEE 10 and the 
emerging countries (Figure A.3.1). Though 
Neoclassical models would predict FDI 
moving to capital-poor countries like 
Romania, the opposite occurred. Roma-
nia’s capacity to attract FDI per capita 
is less than an eighth of that of the 
Czech Republic and less than half that 
of Poland – the least FDI competitive 
country among the new EU members. 
Romania still ranked in fifth in the CEE 
10 in terms of cumulative FDI inflows in 
the same period, reaching less than a 
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quarter of Poland’s (Figure A.3.2). This 
aspect is addressed later in more detail, 
in the discussion of national business 
environment. 
The average real growth rates over 
the same period were positive, except in 
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Estonia. This is equivalent to saying that 
the initial output losses in these five 
countries were so great that despite their 
sound recent growth performance, they 
have not recovered to 1989 income levels 
(Figure A.4.1). Romania’s average growth 
rate of real GDP per capita in 1992–
2001 was 0.3 per cent, leading to a 
relative GDP per capita to the Euro zone 
of almost 30 per cent in 2001, which 
was much lower than the CEE 10 aver-
age. According to the optimistic scenario 
estimates of Wagner and Hlouskova 
(2004), Romania will need 94 years to 
reach the EU 24 GDP per capita level 
(Luxembourg excluded). But 2000 was 
the first year in which Romania regis-
tered a real GDP increase (2.1 per cent). 
This increased in ensuing years (5.7 per 
cent in 2001, 4.9 per cent in 2002 and 
4.7 per cent in 2003, according to 
WIIW figures), leading to an annual av-
erage increase in GDP per capita of 3.35 
per cent in 2000–2003. 
The average real per capita GDP of 
the CEE 10 compared to the EU rose 
from about 35 per cent in 1992 to al-
most 40 per cent in 2001 (Figure A.4.2). 
At the same time, the share of total real 
GDP declined from 15 per cent to about 
13 per cent. This is explained by the dif-
ferent annual rates of population growth: 
-0.15 per cent for the CEE 10 in com-
parison with +0.33 per cent for the EU.  
These gaps translate into human 
capital development indicators. Romania 
had the highest infant mortality rate in 
1990–2001 (Figure A.5.1), the lowest life 
expectancy at birth (Figure A.5.2) and 
living standards (Figure A.5.3). As re-
gards the income distribution, Romania’s 
Gini coefficient of GDP per capita in 
1996–8 relative to 1987–90 increased 
more than those of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia and Poland, but less 
than those of Lithuania, Estonia and Bul-
garia (Figure A.5.3). 
To sum up, a quantification of the 
soundness of the macroeconomic envi-
ronment as a determinant factor of GDP 
per capita growth was made by Blanke, 
Paua and Sala-i-Martin (2004), on the 
basis of the first model developed by 
Sachs and McArthur (2001). They took 
the macroeconomic environment index in 
2003 (ranging from 1 unfavourable to 7 
favourable) as a weighted average of 
three sub-indexes – the macroeconomic 
stability sub-index (weighted at 1/2), the 
country credit rating in March 2003, 
and government waste in 2003 (each 
weighted at 1/4). These were built on 
hard data (government surplus/deficits, 
national saving rates, inflation, real ex-
change rates relative to USD, lending-
borrowing interest rate spread in 2002) 
and survey questions. Despite improve-
ments in the macroeconomic environment 
since 2001, Romania lagged far behind 
other accession countries (Figure A.7.1) 
at 1.07 percentage points below CEE 10 
average in 2003 (Figure A.7.2). 
Figure A.7.1 also brings out a cru-
cial notion, the existence of a correlation 
at country level between the macroeco-
nomic environment index, public institu-
tion index and technology index, which 
together suggest complex patterns of in-
teraction. In Romania’s case, public insti-
tution quality proves the biggest lag in 
terms of growth competitiveness. The gap 
between Romania and the CEE 10 aver-
age is -1.34, greater than the gaps in 
the macroeconomic stability index (-1.07) 
or in the technology sophistication index 
(-0.56). 
Table 3 
Correlations between the three pillars of 
growth competitiveness in the CEE 10 
 
Macroeconomic environment index 0.88 
The public institution index 0.91 
The technology index 0.76 
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Socio-political and public institu-
tional development 
A first assessment of the interaction be-
tween economic reforms and politics 
should consider the ability of the political 
system to overcome the macroeconomic 
cost of reform during transition. It has 
been seen that the closer to a market 
system an economy comes, the greater 
the expectable beneficial effects on 
growth. However, the literature finds 
that current reform affects growth nega-
tively, while lagged reform affects 
growth positively and eventually starts to 
dominate. In the transition context, the 
content of reform was more or less 
agreed, but its speed and sequencing 
were heavily debated, with discussion 
focusing on a choice between big bang 
or gradualism. From a theoretical point 
of view, the importance of reform rever-
sals lies in the existence of reversal 
costs. This issue was addressed by Mer-
levede (2003), who analyses the incidence 
of reform-reversal costs that are crucial 
to the domination of gradualist strategies 
over big-bang strategies in the presence 
of aggregate uncertainty (in terms of 
distribution of costs and gains). Reform 
reversal is defined as downgrading in 
the level of an average reform indicator. 
He explicitly introduces a reversal pa-
rameter into a simultaneous equation 
system with growth and the level of re-
form as dependent variables, and con-
cludes that a reversal generates an im-
mediate negative contribution to real 
output growth. Taking into account the 
level of reform a country achieved, a 
reversal is found to be more costly at 
higher levels of the reform indicator. For 
a sample of 16 highly studied reforming 
countries (Romania and other 2 CEE 
countries included), Tommasi and Velasco 
(1997) report election outcomes and their 
impact upon the reform process. In only 
one out of the 16, were reforms re-
versed by the new government, where in 
a small number of countries a change in 
political circumstances led to a slowdown 
in reform, and in several, reforms con-
tinued even after the opposition to the 
initial reforming government took power.  
Freedom House places the political 
systems of transition economies in 1990–
99 in four main groups, according to 
ratings based on average scores for po-
litical rights and civil liberties ranging 
from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). The 
thresholds for determining the country 
groups are these: 
* Competitive democracies: political 
rights <= 2.0 and civil liberties <= 
2.5. 
* Concentrated political regimes: political 
rights or civil liberties > 2.5. 
* War-torn regimes: > 5 political rights 
or civil liberties > 2.5. 
* Non-competitive political regimes: po-
litical rights or civil liberties >5. 
Romania is gauged as having a 
concentrated political regime, higher than 
Bulgaria’s and 1.6 times higher than the 
CEE 8 average (Figure A.6.1). 
A second assessment should address 
governments, with their major role in 
building efficient public institutions that 
businesses have to deal with. The prop-
erty rights and contracts enforcement 
guaranteed by a legal and judicial sys-
tem under a strong rule of law are 
crucial to creating the wealth potential 
out of a free market economy. Corrup-
tion is also a major source of distortion 
of economic growth and development. In 
quantifying the soundness of public insti-
tutions in 2003, Blanke et al. (2004) 
used a public institutions index (ranging 
from 1 weak or non-existent to 7 
strong): a simple average of two sub-
indices – the contracts and law and the 
corruption sub-index – aggregated on 
the basis of survey questions. Democratic 
institutions improved in the past seven 
years, except in Bulgaria and Romania, 
but remained weak compared with the 
advanced economies. Despite improve-
ments in political stability since 2001, 
Romania lags far behind other accession 
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countries (Figure A.7.1) at 1.34 percent-
age points below the CEE 10 average in 
2003 (Figure A.7.2). The high correlation 
between level of economic development, 
measured in terms of GDP per capita, 
and institutional quality underlines the 
importance of developing better institu-
tions of governance in laggard countries. 
Public institutional maturity itself 
depends also on the expectation of EU 
membership, so that for the following 
three years, the author expects a much 
higher speed of institutional and eco-
nomic improvement in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania, in terms of an optimistic 2007 
date for joining the EU. 
Upgrading technology 
The main lesson of Neoclassical growth 
theory is that an economy cannot grow 
in the long term without technological 
progress (Solow 1956). This may trans-
late into much cheaper products and/or 
dramatically improved quality, leading to 
higher market shares and economic 
growth. With more efficient institutions 
and stable macroeconomic environments, 
the importance and effects of technology 
improvements on economic growth are 
increasing drastically (Blanke et al. 
2004). Related to this is the important 
lesson of a more open and integrated 
world: improvements in a nation’s com-
petitiveness are not a linear process, but 
one in which countries at different de-
velopment levels face different challenges 
and priorities (in Schumpeterian evolu-
tionary models).  
These underlying features of tech-
nological progress explain Romania’s lag 
in the transition period, and Bulgaria’s, 
as they are still coping with low quality 
of public institutions and an unsound 
stable macroeconomic context, relative to 
the other CEE countries. Instead, technol-
ogy upgrading seems to be and should 
be the main driving force in the catch-
ing-up process.  
Capacity for innovation in the in-
vestment-driven stage of the Romanian 
economy’s development is small and con-
centrated in manufacturing and out-
sourced service exports. (Financial crises 
and external sector-specific demand 
shocks are evident at this stage). The 
main mechanisms of technology diffusion 
remain higher FDI inflow, a more com-
plex foreign-trade structure, and imita-
tion or adoption of knowledge developed 
by leading economies. Improvements in 
information and communication-
technology infrastructure and educational 
and research capabilities should acceler-
ate transfers further.  
One method of measuring the tech-
nological sophistication of an economy, 
designed by Blanke et al. (2004), is the 
technology index. This is a weighted av-
erage of three sub-indices: an innovation 
sub-index (weighted at 1/2 for core-
innovator economies and 1/3 for non-
core innovators), an information and 
communication technology sub-index and 
a technology transfer sub-index (each 
weighted at 1/4 for core-innovator 
economies and 1/3 for non-core innova-
tors). Romania’s technology transfer in-
dex is close to the CEE average, but lags 
behind in terms of the innovation and 
information and communication technol-
ogy endowments, leading to an overall 
0.59 percentage-point gap in technology 
sophistication behind the CEE average in 
2003. 
Trade approach to CEE countries’ 
convergence 
Analysis of revealed economic develop-
ment and the prospects for future 
growth depends largely on trade, invest-
ment (e.g. Tondl and Vuksic 2003), insti-
tutional change (e.g. Crespo-Cuaresma 
2002), and to a lesser extent, migration 
(Sinn and Ochel 2003). In trade terms, 
extensive economic integration between 
current and new EU member-states oc-
curred as part of the pre-accession 
process (Ben-David and Rahman 1996b; 
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Brenton and Gros 1997; Forslid et al. 
1999; Venables 1999 and 2001; Breuss 
2001; Manzocchi and Ottaviano 2001; 
Brenton and Manzocchi 2002; Pelkmans 
2002; Fidrmuc et al. 2002).  
Trade growth and economic growth 
were higher in the transition economies 
than in the EU (intra-trade included) in 
1995–2002 (Figure B.1.1). A big role was 
played by the increase of FDI inflow into 
the former, associated with a remarkable 
decrease in the FDI entering Latin Amer-
ica (Figure B.1.2), but the distribution of 
the FDI among the CEE 10 was dispro-
portionate to the countries’ potentials. 
Their trade patterns are heterogeneous in 
average annual export growth rates, per 
capita GDP, per capita stock of FDI, and 
simple average MFN tariff (Figure B.1.3). 
Romania’s highest simple average MFN 
tariff, associated with the lowest per 
capita stock of FDI and with the lowest 
GDP per capita (except for Bulgaria), 
correlates with relatively similar annual 
average export growth rates in Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 
1995–2002. 
The same period brought marked 
structural changes in exports. The share 
of manufactures in total goods exports 
rose in all CEE countries, with higher 
levels registered in countries that at-
tracted more FDI: Hungary (+19.8 per-
centage points), Poland (+10.9), Czech 
Republic (+6.8), Bulgaria (+5) and Ro-
mania (+3.7), see (Figures B.1.4 and 
B.1.5). The share of agricultural products 
in goods exports decreased more in all 
accession countries than at world or EU 
level: Hungary (-15.6 percentage points), 
Bulgaria (-10.3), Poland and the Czech 
Republic (-4.4 each) and Romania (-3.5).  
Romania’s trade performance re-
mains relatively weak despite high rates 
of export and import increase in 1995–
2002. Average Romanian trade per cap-
ita in 2000–2002 represented less than 
one third of Czech or Hungarian levels, 
about half of the Slovak level, almost 
equal to that of Poland, and higher than 
that of Bulgaria (Table B.1.1).  
Analysed according to three main 
product groups – clothing, textiles, and 
automotive products – Romania had 
much the highest share of clothing in 
total merchandise exports (an increase of 
17.1 percentage points in 2002 over 
1990, equivalent to an almost tenfold 
increase over the period). Meanwhile the 
share of clothing products increased by 
only 0.1 percentage points on a world 
level (equivalent to a twofold increase in 
2002 over 1990), and decreased by 0.6 
percentage points in the EU. The share 
of textiles in total merchandise exports 
decreased on a world level and in the 
CEE countries and the EU. Only Poland’s 
textile exports maintained their share, 
but Romania’s decreased to the least ex-
tent of all accession countries in 1995–
2002. Romania did well in clothing ex-
ports and to a lesser extent in textiles, 
where exports doubled against stagnation 
in world trade in 1995–2002. This spe-
cialization pattern is explained by the 
high ratio of outward processing trade 
(loan production) in the clothing and 
textile industries. However, Romania did 
badly in the automotive industry, where 
world trade increased twofold in 2002 
relative to 1990, and 30 per cent rela-
tive to 1995. Romania had the lowest 
share and the slowest increase in the 
share of automotive products in total 
goods exports. Slovakia (+15.5 percent-
age points) and Hungary (+12.3) were 
the best performers, in shares and share 
increases, between 1995 and 2002. The 
Czech Republic and Poland came next 
with increases of 9.6 and 8.3 percentage 
points respectively (Table B.1.2). 
Since Romania’s trade in goods 
with the EU was largely liberalized dur-
ing the 1990s, EU membership means 
moving into a customs union from a 
pre-existing free-trade area. It should 
therefore make only a small immediate 
impact on goods trade with the eight 
new EU members and give further gains 
only in the medium and long run, 
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through increased investment and further 
production specialization (Landesmann 
and Stehrer 2002). Nevertheless, there 
remain areas where trade has yet to be 
fully liberalized, such as the automobile 
product group, and there is limited 
trade in services, including financial ser-
vices. Trade in agriculture is also not 
fully liberalized, although agro-food 
trade increased substantially in the pre-
accession period. The increase of total 
Romanian foreign trade in the last 14 
years was boosted by the main free 
trade agreements concluded, with im-
ports constantly surpassing exports. (The 
highest trade deficit was in 2003, after 
the 2002 elimination of tariff barriers on 
trade in industrial products with the EU, 
EFTA and CEFTA, see Figure B.1.6). 
The trade asymmetries between 
Romania and the EU, in terms of simple 
average MFN tariffs, were still relevant 
in 2002 (three times higher as an overall 
average, see Figure B.1.6). Experience in 
Romania and elsewhere suggests that 
highly protected domestic markets not 
only reduce the incentive to export, but 
also penalize the economy by allowing 
inefficient domestic producers to extract 
policy-induced rents from domestic con-
sumers. While there is a plausible theo-
retical case for supporting infant indus-
tries in activities with strong learning 
effects and positive externalities, experi-
ence suggests that such a policy should 
be limited in time and linked to per-
formance. Theory also suggests that tariff 
protection is not the most efficient means 
of providing such support, although in 
practice it has been by far the most 
common. 
Nevertheless, the trade open-
ness/intensity index – an estimator for 
trade integration of goods (average of 
imports and exports of goods items in 
the balance of payments divided by GDP) 
– ranks Romania in ninth of the CEE 10. 
Slovakia is an exceptional performer in 
integrating into the international economy 
through trade, while Poland is the least 
integrated (Figure B.1.8). Hungary instead 
had the highest speed of trade-
integration growth in 1995–2002, associ-
ated with one of the highest cumulative 
FDI stock and FDI stock per capita. The 
share of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) in exports has become an ex-
tremely large 90 per cent in Hungary, 
followed by 60 per cent in the Czech 
Republic and Poland, and 30 per cent in 
Slovakia. GDP per capita convergence 
and FDI intensity (FDI inflows and out-
flows relative to GDP) showed a positive 
correlation in 1991–2002 in the CEE av-
erage, being higher in Poland and 
Lithuania, but lower in Slovakia, Latvia 
and Estonia. The correlation was negative 
in Hungary, Czech Republic and Roma-
nia. 
High FDI inflows in the transition 
period soaked up the Hungarian econ-
omy’s absorption capacity, and led, im-
plicitly, to smaller FDI flows, giving it 
the lowest FDI intensity among the CEE 
10 in 2002, but coupled with relatively 
high trade openness (Figure B.1.9). Ro-
mania lagged in 2002 in integration into 
the international economy – in trade and 
FDI intensity – while Slovakia outper-
formed in both. A positive correlation 
(0.56) between trade and FDI intensity 
remained in the CEE 10 in 2002, but 
with strong annual variations. The posi-
tive correlation for the CEE 10 increased 
to 0.72, taking into account FDI stock 
per capita in 1989–2002 and trade 
openness in 2002. 
In Romania, though, a very strong 
negative correlation (-0.90) between FDI 
and trade intensity in 1997–2002 re-
sulted from a fairly constant level of FDI 
absorption, high GDP growth and even 
higher trade growth, except in 1997–9, 
when record FDI flows coincided with 
sharp GDP decline, which again explains 
the high negative correlation (Table 
B.1.10). Thus trade seems to have been a 
much more important driving force for 
convergence in Romania than foreign in-
vestment in the last seven years, which 
conflicts with the empirical findings on 
the CEE average.  
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The high Romanian economic 
growth rates in the last three years 
largely derived from domestic demand. 
This conflicts with the neoclassical ap-
proach (the lack of any role for demand 
in affecting the rate of growth, still pre-
sent in the new growth theory), and with 
the economic-growth pattern elsewhere in 
the CEE countries. It raises questions 
about the role of demand in the compo-
sition of national activities and the proc-
ess of structural change in affecting 
Romania’s performance, on the one 
hand, and about the long-term sustain-
ability of economic growth on the other. 
Even if the new growth and trade mod-
els underestimate the role of demand, 
they recognize the crucial role of techni-
cal change and its endogeny. But the 
impact of technological specialization on 
Romania’s international competitiveness 
and economic growth is discussed later, 
after a look at the main challenges for 
the national business environment.  
Microeconomic reform 
Macro reforms usually end in problems 
in the short and medium term by raising 
interest rates and prices while cutting 
public expenditures, but micro reforms 
can produce tangible, visible benefits for 
citizens, ease inefficiencies, increase tech-
nology specialization, improve product 
quality and end anti-competitive practices 
(Porter 2004). Nonetheless, no reforms, 
macro or micro, come without pain. 
Here political will and public support for 
real economic changes are related. (See 
the earlier discussion of socio-political 
and institutional systems.)  
The private sector has become cru-
cial to improving competitiveness and 
setting economic policy. Microeconomic 
policies also govern the effects of trade 
agreements and other measures to open 
markets – a major consideration in in-
ternational economic policymaking today. 
The benefits of these correlate highly 
with microeconomic progress. 
To assess the depth of the micro-
economic reforms and the effects of the 
trade liberalization agreements on the 
adjustments to the Romanian business 
environment, the following methodology 
is proposed:  
LEXPORT = C(1)*LEXPORT(-1) + C(2)*LIMPORT 
+ C(3)* LCURS_ (-1) + C(4)*DUMMY1993 + 
C(5)*DUMMY1995 + C(6)*DUMMY1998 + 
C(7)*DUMMY2002 + C(8) 
The role and impact of the relevant 
determinant factors of export dynamics 
identified are exchange rate and imports 
(not including GDP, as it is a function 
of microeconomic reforms as well). By 
introducing into the regression equation 
exports as the dependent variable, the 
following are the changes in logarithmic 
monthly time series (as the annual time 
series are too short), according to the 
statistical data available for 1991–2003: 
* Exports FOB in million USD, current 
prices (LEXPORT). 
* ROL/USD nominal exchange rate 
(LROL_USD(-1)) – monthly exchange-rate 
changes are considered to have rele-
vant influence on export dynamics in 
the following month. 
* Imports CIF in million USD, current 
prices (LIMPORT). 
The role and incidence of the main 
Romanian liberalization agreements are 
identified so as to depict the component 
of export dynamics not explained by the 
decrease or elimination of trade barriers, 
nor by relevant macroeconomic factors. 
Estimating the effect on Romanian trade 
growth of the main steps in the trade 
liberalization process – by introducing 
dummy variables in the regression equa-
tion for the advent of these steps (and 
completed removal of trade barriers on 
industrial products with the EU) – helps 
to proxy the degree to which national 
business capacity can adjust to the new 
export opportunities. Much of this de-
rives from microeconomic reforms that 
facilitate efforts by the private sector to 
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increase market shares. The main trade 
liberalization steps were: 
* May 1993: EU/EFTA Interim Association 
Agreement. 
* February 1995: EU Association Agree-
ment; 1995 was also the year Roma-
nia joined the WTO. 
* July 1998: CEFTA membership. 
* January 2002: elimination of trade 
barriers for industrial products with 
the EU, EFTA and CEFTA (except for 
sensitive products). 
Dummy variables have the value 0 
before each of these liberalization steps 
and 1 afterwards, as the long-run effect 
of these liber-
alization stages 
are considered. 
So are those of 
the Romanian 
agreements with 
EU: DUMMY1993 
= 0 between 
1991:2 and 
1993:4, 1 be-
tween 1993:5 
and 1995:2, 
and 0 between 
1995:3 and 
2003:12, as the 
EU Interim As-
sociation Agree-
ment is 
replaced by the 
EU Association 
Agreement. 
DUMMY1995  = 
0 between 1991:2 and 1995:1, 1 between 
1995:2 and 2001:12, and 0 between 
2002:1 and 2003:12, as December 2001 
was the deadline for completing the 
transition period related to tariff-barrier 
reductions between Romania and EU, on 
an asymmetric basis. DUMMY1998 = 0 
between 1991:6 and 1998:6, 1 between 
1998:7 and 2001:12, and 0 between 
2002:1 and 2003:12, as December 2001 
was the deadline for completing the 
transition period for tariff-barrier reduc-
tions between Romania and CEFTA, on a 
symmetric basis. DUMMY2002 = 0 be-
tween 1991:6 and 2001:12, 1 between 
2002:1 and 2003:12, taking into consid-
eration the long-run effect of tariff-
barrier elimination on industrial products 
and of cuts in other trade barriers on 
agricultural products, starting in January 
2002. 
The results are:  
LEXPORT = 0.18*LEXPORT(-1) + 0.41*LIMPORT 
+ 0.05*LCURS_USD(-1) +  
0.07*DUMMY1993 + 0.11*DUMMY1995 - 
0.004*DUMMY1998 + 0.27*DUMMY2002 
+1.97 
The statistically significant results of 
the estimation suggest: 
* The exchange rate has a positive ef-
fect on export dynamics, in accor-
dance with economic theory, but to a 
small extent: with 1 per cent deprecia-
tion, exports increase by 0.05 per 
cent. 
* There is high dependence of exports 
on imports: with a 1 per cent increase 
in imports, exports increase by 0,41 
per cent. This is explained by the high 
Dependent Variable: LEXPORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample (adjusted): 1991:02 2003:12 
Included observations: 155 after adjusting endpoints 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LEXPORT(-1) 0.187018 0.062628 2.986192 0.0033 
LIMPORT 0.413267 0.046482 8.890941 0.0000 
LCURS_USD(-1) 0.052174 0.016118 3.236918 0.0015 
DUMMY 1993 0.075619 0.041425 1.825433 0.0700 
DUMMY 1995 0.110504 0.054878 2.013611 0.0459 
DUMMY 1998 -0.004164 0.030990 -0.134370 0.8933 
DUMMY 2002 0.270279 0.076361 3.539507 0.0005 
C 1.979077 0.332398 5.953937 0.0000 
R-squared 0.950894 Mean dependent variable 6.506157 
Adjusted R-squared 0.948555 S.D. dependent variable 0.434065 
S. E. of regression 0.098452 Akaike info criterion -1.748261 
Sum squared residual 1.424842 Schwarz criterion -1.591181 
Log likelihood 143.4902 F-statistic 406.6435 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.649377 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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dependence of Romanian exports on 
imported raw materials and energy, 
with deep fragmentation of the pro-
duction system. (A significant propor-
tion of imports is re-exported, the 
loan-production system being relevant 
for low-skilled manufacturing industry, 
especially textiles and clothing, which 
have the highest share of Romania’s 
exports to the EU.) 
* Three of the four liberalization stages 
in Romania had positive effects on 
export growth; one had negative. The 
biggest came in 2002, when trade lib-
eralization led to the most dynamic 
annual export increase (a coefficient 
of 0.27), reinforced by high economic 
growth, deepening macroeconomic sta-
bilization, and learning effects in the 
business environment, accelerating to-
tal growth of exports. The 1995 and 
1993 measures also had positive ef-
fects, but to a smaller extent: only 
0.11 and 0.7 percentage points respec-
tively of the 6.5 mean of export dy-
namics. This reflects persistence of 
systemic distortions in the domestic 
economy, as a relevant impediment to 
export promotion. The free-trade 
agreement with CEFTA did not have 
expected positive effects (a negative 
coefficient of 0.004, but the high 
Prob. suggests the event had no effect 
on export dynamics). Romania turned 
out to be a less competitive trading 
partner relative to the CEFTA countries. 
The entry into force of this agreement 
proved quite unfavourable, as the in-
crease in the trade deficit with the 
CEFTA countries was even higher than 
the one registered with the EU. Of a 
mean of 6.5 for annual export dy-
namics, only 0.18 is explained by the 
EU free-trade agreement and another 
0.27 by the end of the transition pe-
riod in trade-barrier reductions. This 
betrays relatively low capacity by Ro-
manian business to reap the advan-
tages of the extra access to foreign 
markets (only 0.51 was due to free-
trade agreements), notably of CEFTA 
membership (0.08). Romanian exports 
were less competitive in CEFTA than in 
EU markets. The biggest effect came 
in 2002 (explaining 0.20 of the 6.45 
mean of export dynamics), when 
trade-barrier elimination for industrial 
products, reinforced by high economic 
growth, deepening macroeconomic sta-
bilization and learning effects in the 
business environment accelerating the 
total growth of exports. 
The relatively high constant reveals 
that 1.97 of the mean of the dependent 
variable of 6.5 is explained by factors 
not considered in this equation, such as 
other changes in Romanian trade policy, 
trade-barrier effects and external market 
factors (foreign demand, foreign prices 
etc. ignored in the regression for lack of 
data). 
The general conclusion from these 
estimates is that the impacts on export 
dynamics of free-trade agreements con-
cluded with the EU were higher than 
those that emerged from CEFTA. But these 
positive trade performances were below 
the CEE average and highly driven by 
labour-intensive industries (especially 
clothing, leather and footwear, dominated 
by outward processing trade). The mi-
croeconomic reforms and national busi-
ness environment in general were less 
able to help exporters reap the opportu-
nities of the new market-access benefits 
relative to other CEE countries (see again 
Table B.1.1). If local companies do not 
improve productivity and sophistication, 
market opening will boost imports. (Rele-
vant here is the year 2003; see also Fig-
ure B.1.6.) Growth in exports and attrac-
tion of FDI will be painfully slow. More-
over, Romania’s improvements in the mi-
croeconomic business environment began 
after market-opening measures were 
completed, not before, as economic ra-
tionality would dictate. All this proves 
that the domestic barriers (macro and 
micro reforms, institutional reforms etc.) 
were more painful, and added to the 
foreign non-tariff barriers, impeded the 
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optimal export growth to be expected 
from the trade liberalization agreements.  
National business environment 
Romania is a low-wage, labour-intensive 
economy. But though wages in Romania 
are low by international standards, they 
are not relative to near neighbours such 
as Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria and the 
CIS countries. Furthermore, cost competi-
tiveness is determined by productivity, 
and allowing for differences in labour 
and capital productivity suggests that on 
average Romania may not be a lower-
cost location than its neighbours. Stabili-
zation programmes have been imple-
mented to speed up privatization and 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises. 
It is widely acknowledged that slow 
growth in private investment, particularly 
in large-scale manufacturing, has been 
an important constraint on Romania’s 
economic growth. Part of the explanation 
lies in the uncertain legislative environ-
ment, but more narrowly economic and 
institutional aspects have also had nega-
tive impacts on investment decisions. It is 
a common complaint from the private 
sector that Romania still has a heavily 
regulated business environment. A par-
ticular cause for concern is the lengthy 
delays with customs clearance, which 
make it very difficult for businesses to 
keep optimal levels of inventories and 
rule out any idea of ‘just in time’. How-
ever, there is awareness of these prob-
lems, in particular of the need to 
streamline the tax administration. Some 
measures have been taken to improve 
the business environment. 
Despite legal and regulatory 
changes, FDI inflows remain below ex-
pectations. The greatest FDI inflows took 
place during the period of declining GDP 
(in 1998 – more than USD 2 billion). 
Modest flows remained after 1999 and 
the government’s introduction of major 
financial reforms in early 2000, to re-
duce public spending, accelerate privati-
zation and reform the fiscal system. The 
annual average in 1999–2002 was about 
USD 1.1 billion (some 15 per cent of an-
nual gross fixed-capital formation, com-
pared with an average of 2.7 per cent 
in 1985–95). Further incentives for FDI 
introduced in 2000–2002 kept the ab-
sorption steady. In 2002, FDI in Roma-
nia represented 3.8 per cent of the total 
flow into CEE countries, 4.6 per cent of 
the FDI stock in CEE countries, and 0.16 
per cent of world FDI inflows, despite 
Romania’s relatively greater economic 
size. However, FDI stock did increase 
tenfold in 1991–5 and twentyfold in 
1991–2002. The ratio of FDI stock in 
GDP reached 20 per cent in 2002 (cf. 
Czech Republic 55 per cent, Hungary 38 
per cent, and a world average of 22.3 
per cent). These trends were associated 
with a 135 per cent rise in the number 
of MNC affiliates in Romania in 1991–
2002. However, the inward FDI potential 
relative to performance increased from 
0.3 per cent in 1993–5 to an average of 
0.6 per cent in 1999–2002. 
The lag in attracting FDI has less-
ened potential spillover effects from 
newer or more sophisticated technologies 
in wholly owned firms, or higher re-
quirements of domestic suppliers by joint 
ventures. Even when FDI occurs, such 
effects are not always felt. 
Several further observations on the 
competitiveness of Romania’s business 
environment point to favourable and un-
favourable features for reaping exports 
from the free-trade agreements (Croitoru 
and Tarhoaca 2002; Scutaru and Flo-
rescu 2003; Vass 2004):  
* The main export-oriented industries 
(23 industries with shares higher than 
1 per cent of total manufacturing ex-
ports) were the source of 80 per cent 
of Romania’s total exports: textiles 
and clothing (16.5 per cent), leather 
products and footwear (7.5 per cent), 
metals and articles thereof other than 
basic metals (5.6 per cent), agricul-
ture (5.5 per cent), etc. These ab-
sorbed only 3.24 per cent of the 
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funds offered by the financial, bank-
ing and insurance sector in 1999. 
* The decreasing share of money trans-
fers through bank export-payment in-
struments (payment orders, letters of 
credit) in total exports leads to the 
conclusion that exporters sacrifice 
payment safety or security (at higher 
cost) in favour of the rapidity of less 
safe payment instruments (warrants, 
direct bank transfers, etc.). The high 
bank charges and delays in handling 
secure systems may explain a fall in 
the proportion of exports paid with 
letters of credit from 97.8 per cent in 
1993 to 12.1 per cent in 2002. 
Meanwhile those paid with payment 
orders rose from 21 per cent to 4.4 
per cent. 
* The major comparative advantage of 
Romanian exports comes from low la-
bour costs, yet the 23 main export 
industries accounted for only 24.5 per 
cent of aggregate pay and only 30 
per cent of total gross value added in 
the Romanian economy, in 1999. 
* Manufacturing industries with unfa-
vourable social costs or negative value 
added contributed 40 per cent of to-
tal manufacturing exports in 1998, 
which suggests that Romania was still 
at a stage of exporting under duress. 
Exports were highly concentrated in 
the state sector, which operates at low 
efficiency, and assisted by exchange-
rate depreciation. But the share of the 
private sector in total exports in-
creased from 48.7 per cent in 1998 
to 69.2 per cent in 2003. 
* Looking at the share of gross value 
added in aggregate pay in the indus-
tries concerned, the most competitive 
seem to be air transport industry and 
machines, and the office equipment 
industry, but production matters more 
than productivity when estimating ex-
port performances. 
* The 23 export-oriented industries con-
sume only 20 per cent of total Roma-
nian R and D expenditure. 
* These industries do not receive pro-
duction subsidies, except for vegetable 
products, which obtain almost a quar-
ter of the total subsidies offered in 
the Romanian economy. 
* The only export-oriented industry with 
a significant share in total income-tax 
receipts is petroleum, with 13.6 per 
cent of the VAT and other product 
taxes. This, of course, is a support 
industry for all the others, so that 
there are significant spillover effects. 
* New laws in the transition economies 
were designed to reduce state inter-
vention in the private sector. Such ini-
tiatives in Romania evolved de facto in 
quite different ways. It is important to 
look at the government ‘reforms’, 
which created new 24 special funds 
that imposed further financial and 
administrative obstacles at the micro-
economic level: difficult certificateion 
procedures, authorizations, inspection 
or other compulsory operational tasks. 
Many of these derived from imple-
menting the acquis communautaire. 
But one did not, and is directly af-
fecting exporters: the imposition of a 
0.5 per cent tax on exports, for the 
Special Fund for Custom Development 
and Modernization. No levy of this 
kind is made in other transition 
economies. 
* There are also initiatives to promote 
what is called the ‘single-window 
shop’, inter-institutional collaboration 
that tries to eliminate subjective stages 
of public administration in licensing, 
approval or notice procedures, 
through a specialized electronic trade 
net. The implementation process of 
automatic document approvals in ac-
cordance with EU standards for ex-
port-import operations is still quite 
slow. This is compounded by ineffi-
cient systems applied in foreign trade 
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(e.g. drawbacks) and by corruption 
and abuses in the customs service. 
The private sector is not only a 
consumer of the business environment. It 
can also play an important role in shap-
ing and improving it through educational 
programmes, attracting suppliers, defin-
ing standards, quality certification pro-
grammes, manufacturing assistance cen-
tres, and collective industry bodies (Por-
ter 2004). Collective bodies such as trade 
associations, chambers of commerce, en-
trepreneurs’ networks, standard setting 
agencies, quality centres and technology 
networks are also important in improv-
ing infrastructure, providing training and 
developing overlooked export markets. 
All these have been called institutions for 
collaboration (IFCs), as developed. They 
were largely ignored in economic devel-
opment thinking, but have an essential 
role in connecting and in fostering effi-
cient collective activities. 
Porter (1998b) also estimated the 
Microeconomic Competitiveness Index, 
which turned in 2004 into the Business 
Competitiveness Index (ranking 80 coun-
tries). Though a far from perfect estima-
tion of the array of national circum-
stances that support a high and sustain-
able level of productivity, it represents 
an advance in understanding the frame-
work of competitive strengths and weak-
nesses for a country and the firms oper-
ating in it. An economy cannot be com-
petitive unless companies operating there 
are competitive. True competitiveness 
comes from high production levels asso-
ciated with high productivity, allowing 
countries to support high wages, a 
strong currency and attractive returns to 
capital, and implicitly, a high standard 
of living. Productivity growth is the main 
goal, not exports per se. 
The Business Competitiveness Index 
also accounts for 83 per cent of the 
variations across countries in the level of 
GDP per capita. According to this com-
posite index (incorporating the company 
operations and strategy index and qual-
ity of national business environment in-
dex), Estonia in 2003 ranked first 
among the CEE countries. Next came 
Latvia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Lithuania (all in the first 
half of the 80-country sample, as were 
all EU countries). Slovakia and Poland 
were ranked in the next 10 countries in 
the second half of the sample, while 
Romania and Bulgaria lagged at 67th 
and 68th respectively (Table B.2.1).  
These findings highlight the pressing 
need for Romania and Bulgaria to better 
incorporate a microeconomic competitive-
ness agenda into their efforts to stimu-
late economic growth. Otherwise their 
failures (disappointing or low increase in 
returns on investments, stagnant real 
wages, non-materialization of competitive 
exports or jobs) may diminish or even 
cancel out their macroeconomic and so-
cial programmes. 
Romania’s trade pattern with the 
EU 
Trade is a force for Romanian conver-
gence on the EU. When estimating its 
role, special attention has to be paid to 
the various patterns and learning effects 
occurring in EU trade, the extent of 
transformation of trade structures and 
development, the degree of specialization, 
the increase in technology-intensive prod-
ucts, the fields dominated by foreign 
capital and domestic capital, etc. All 
these also derive from transformation of 
the microeconomic environment and 
catch-up performance. Deepening ties 
with the EU have led to de facto inte-
gration of the CEE countries into the EU 
for trade flows – about two-thirds of 
CEE foreign trade is done with the EU. 
It is also the largest investor in the CEE 
economies and becoming the largest do-
nor, through various pre-accession and 
post-accession programmes it finances. 
However, results would suggest that Ro-
mania’s foreign trade-driven convergence 
with the EU is not as spectacular as for 
other accession countries, although it is 
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more relevant than investment-driven 
convergence. The amount of trade has 
grown considerably and Romania’s ex-
port concentration is quite high, but 
natural resource-intensive and low-skilled 
labour-intensive products may face severe 
competitive pressures. Moreover, the fact 
that Romania is one of the largest net 
labour exporters in the region (Langewi-
esche and Lubyova 2000) indicates that 
wage differentials are large enough to 
stimulate temporary and/or permanent 
emigration, meaning that income conver-
gence still lies far ahead. In the early 
years of transition, Romanian outper-
formed other accession countries in for-
eign-trade growth, but the trend re-
versed later. There has been little con-
vergence towards similar structures of 
production. Of course, these situations 
may end with positive results in the 
short or medium term, as the differences 
in production structures encourage spe-
cialization and some wages earned 
abroad returns as remittances (3.3 per 
cent of Romania’s GDP according to 
Daianu, Voinea and Tolici, 2001). These 
positive implications may then create fur-
ther incentives for resource allocation 
outside the economic-convergence para-
digm. 
Foreign trade growth. Romania’s 
trade performance shows quite different 
speeds of increase relative to other CEE 
countries in the periods 1990–95 and 
1995–2002 (Tables B.3.1). In the first 
period, Romania had the highest export 
and import growth rates (218 and 232 
per cent respectively) in the CEE 5, ex-
cept Bulgaria. In the second period, Ro-
mania’s export growth (294 per cent) 
was lower than that of Hungary (445 
per cent), the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (322 per 
cent), and higher than that of Poland 
(244 per cent), Bulgaria or Slovenia (150 
per cent). Romania’s import growth (273 
per cent) was lower than that of Lithua-
nia (347 per cent), Slovakia, Latvia and 
Hungary (309 per cent), and higher 
than that of the Czech Republic (264 per 
cent), Bulgaria, Poland, Estonia and Slo-
venia (154 per cent). 
In the first six years of transition, 
imports grew faster than exports in the 
CEE 5, except for Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic. In 1995–2002, the trend 
was reversed: exports grew faster than 
imports in the CEE 10, except Poland 
and Slovenia. 
Territorial concentration index. 
There is a positive but not significant 
correlation between the CEE countries’ 
export growth rate to the EU in 1995–
2002 and the concentration index of ex-
ports to the EU in 2002 (Figure B.3.1). 
Countries near to the EU 15 border 
showed higher concentration indices of 
exports to EU markets, but not always 
higher export growth rates in 1995–
2002. Romania is less dependent on 
small numbers of export markets than 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia or Slovakia. There is also a high 
correlation between the export and im-
port concentration indexes, as might be 
expected, but Slovenia, Poland and Esto-
nia are remarkable for having an export 
concentration on the EU about a quarter 
higher than the import concentration.  
Romania’s high total export concen-
tration index is explained by an increase 
in the EU share of total exports from 37 
per cent in 1991 to almost 68 per cent 
in 2003. This coincided with decreases in 
the shares of European transition econo-
mies from 34 per cent to 9 per cent 
and of the Russian Federation from al-
most 23 per cent to 0.3 per cent in the 
same period. Romania differs from other 
accession countries in the CEFTA share of 
its total exports, which increased slightly 
from 5.6 per cent to 7.3 per cent in the 
same period (Table B.3.2). This was as-
sociated with the lowest coverage ratio 
in trade between this group of countries. 
Romania is also the one country to re-
cord a lower coverage ratio with CEFTA 
than with the EU after the free-trade 
agreement of 1997 (Voinea 2002b).  
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Three aspects are important when 
considering the convergence process in 
the CEE 10. (i) Trade concentration ratios 
show low instability over time but with a 
positive trend. (ii) There is spatial insta-
bility in the form of different conver-
gence groupings. (iii) spatial auto-
correlation implies higher concentration 
ratios and positive growth spillovers be-
tween the EU and CEE countries close to 
the EU border. All these results depend, 
of course, on the period studied and 
need reassessing over a longer period. 
Learning vs. demonstration effects. 
Analysing the main indicators for foreign 
trade with EU in 1993–2003 (Table 
B.3.3), a massive learning effect in the 
last decade can be discerned. This ap-
pears in a significantly improved cover-
age ratio: from 68.5 per cent in 1993 to 
86.1 per cent in 2003, with a high of 
89.6 per cent in 2000 and an almost 
comparable level in 2002. It also ap-
pears in demonstration effects (including 
those to other potential exporters) re-
vealed by higher volume (reaching 67.7 
per cent for the EU share in Romania’s 
goods exports and 57.7 per cent for its 
imports in 2003).  
Shift to complexity? Has the mount-
ing trade shifted towards more complex 
products helpful in closing the develop-
ment gap with the EU? 
1. Romania’s trade deficit with EU in 
2003 had more than doubled since 1993 
(Table B.3.3). But this was associated 
with trade intensity increasing by more 
than 50 per cent, from 1.88 in 1993 to 
2.92 in 2003 (Figure B.3.2). The share of 
industrial products in the deficit in-
creased by almost 20 per cent in the 
same period, while that of agricultural 
products decreased by the same amount, 
of course. 
2. The degree of trade specialization 
with the EU (applying the Hirschman 
concentration index to product groups) 
increased in both exports (from 15.2 per 
cent in 1993 to 17.6 per cent in 2002) 
and imports (from 13.5 to 13.9 per 
cent). However, it rose significantly 
higher than the overall Romanian trade 
specialization (12 per cent in imports 
and 13 per cent in exports, in 2002). 
Romania’s current level of total export 
concentration is close to Hungary’s 
(14.36 per cent in 2000), but much 
higher than those of other CEE and de-
veloped economies (2002): Spain (7.34 
per cent), Greece (4.04 per cent), Poland 
(5.33 per cent), Turkey (5.42 per cent), 
Slovakia (7.67 per cent), Czech Republic 
(7.56 per cent in 2000 – OECD 2004, 
estimates at 2-digit level). After 1999, 
trade specialization with the EU de-
creased steadily, to a greater degree in 
imports than in exports (Figure B.3.3). 
These trends translated into a greater, 
much faster increase in import variety 
than in export variety. The latter is ex-
plained also by the lengthy, gradual 
process of increasing the variety of do-
mestic production. Export variety in-
creased by almost 20 per cent (from 
782 product types in 1993 to 931 in 
2000), using the simple measure, and by 
10 per cent in imports (from 1040 to 
1153 in the same period), but to a lesser 
extent than in other CEE countries. The 
relationship between product variety and 
economic growth was addressed by Jones 
(1998) in a simple, semi-endogenous 
growth model. He concluded that 
economies become more productive as 
their available product spectrum widens. 
Starting from this model, Funcke and 
Ruhwedel (2003a) proved that export 
variety is beneficial for growth in transi-
tion economies. Proliferation of variety is 
highest in economic front-runners such 
as Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 
and much lower in Romania, which was 
close to Bulgaria and Slovakia in this 
respect up to 2000. Export variety does 
matter for GDP per capita increase in 
transition economies, but not in all in-
dustries. A breakdown into ‘investment 
goods’ and ‘consumption goods’ suggests 
that the production and export of capital 
goods, which tend to have a higher skill 
intensiveness, contribute significantly to 
growth and determine the path of eco-
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nomic development. The role of higher 
trade variety in explaining increases in 
productivity has been quantified in sev-
eral other empirical works on samples of 
countries (Funcke and Ruhwedel 2003b 
for the OECD, East Asian countries, CIS 
and East European countries; Feenstra 
and Hiau Looi Kee 2004 for developing 
countries). The main finding is that 
catching up in export variety is associ-
ated with narrowing of the productivity 
gap. But crucial questions remain unan-
swered. Is the heterogeneity in the ex-
port variety of transition countries inher-
ent in the way competitive markets oper-
ate and evolve over time? Or does it 
also depend on policy and institutional 
settings in product and labour markets, 
which might be reformed in the context 
of a growth-oriented strategy? 
3. Romanian convergence on the EU is 
revealed by changes in the similarity of 
trade structures, estimated with the Fin-
ger similarity index. An index for ex-
port-structure similarity of 0.77 in 2002 
relative to 1993, and one of 0.81 for 
imports, suggests the pace of structural 
change was much slower than in other 
CEE countries, which translated into 
changes of export structure of almost a 
quarter and of one fifth as regards im-
ports. Up to now, trade structure has 
been seen to change to some extent 
along with an increase in trade concen-
tration/specialization and trade variety. 
These would increase the gains from 
trade when consumers have heterogene-
ous preferences (as trade increases the 
number of product varieties available), 
but the underlying premise is that in-
creasing economies of scale in technology 
have the potential of delivering larger 
welfare gains. 
Analysis of convergence to EU 
structures requires in-depth reflection on 
the complexity of trade structure in rela-
tion to technology complexity. There ap-
pears to be an improvement in the tech-
nological structure of trade. Using the 
classification into high, medium and low-
complexity products devised by Roma-
nia’s Ministry of Development and Fore-
casting, high-complexity export products 
gained 4.5 percentage points (machines 
and equipment; vehicles and associated 
transport equipment; optical, photo-
graphic, cinematographic, medical or 
surgical instruments, clocks and musical 
instruments; and components and miscel-
laneous manufactured articles, including 
furniture), and medium-complexity ex-
ports 6.5 percentage points between 
1993 and 2002 (Figure B.3.4). The trend 
is similar for medium-complexity import 
products, but an inverse trend occurs in 
high-complexity imports (-4.2 percentage 
points). This means a much greater in-
crease in medium-complexity imports 
than in high or low-complexity imports. 
Some of the experts consider that free 
trade causes poorer countries to special-
ize in technologically stagnant products. 
Their point of view is that comparative 
advantage in tradable goods leads to 
specialization, and to the extent that 
countries produce different goods, there 
is no a priori reason to expect technolo-
gies to converge. The departure from 
low and medium-skill, labour-intensive 
products cannot be easy: clothing, foot-
wear and furniture still account for 
more than half of Romania’s exports to 
the EU (Table B.3.4). However, the share 
of technology-intensive products in Ro-
mania’s exports to the EU (23 per cent 
in 2000–2002) had increased by 10 per-
centage points since 1993, and decreased 
in imports (43–5 per cent in 2000–
2003) by almost 3 percentage points, 
according to the Kraus classification 
(Figure B.3.5). But Astrov (2001), apply-
ing WIFO taxonomy to 1999 data, finds 
that only 5 per cent of exports were 
technology-intensive (compared with a 
CEE average of 26 per cent). This would 
indicate that, even within the technology-
intensive groups, Romania was actually 
exporting intermediate, labour-intensive 
goods. 
The more significant, post-1997 in-
crease in the technology-intensive share 
of Romanian exports to the EU correlates 
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highly with a surge in FDI. The FDI 
stock of FDI did not exceed USD 1 bil-
lion at the end of 1996, but increased 
over the next six years to USD 9 billion. 
The machines and equipment, and vehi-
cles and other transportation equipment 
product groups are now dominated by 
foreign capital and productivity has 
grown considerably. Yet these product 
groups were still facing negative revealed 
comparative advantages (RCA) in 2002. 
The share of the former in exports stag-
nated in 2000–2002, but decreased in 
imports (-2.5 percentage points), while 
the latter increased its share of exports 
(by 1 percentage point) and to a greater 
extent its imports (2.3 percentage points). 
However, the relatively constant annual 
FDI inflows in 2000–2002 (USD 1 bil-
lion) were associated with a stagnant 
share of technology-intensive exports to 
the EU. It will also be seen later that 
this is strongly reflected in a relatively 
stagnant share of intra-industry trade 
(adjusted IGL: 66 per cent over 2000–
2002), meaning that structural change 
derived from the trade expansion in-
creased significantly until 1999, but af-
terwards was relatively stagnant. This is 
in line with the change in the similarity 
of trade structures (FSI index) within 
Romania and the EU, which increased by 
almost a quarter in exports up to 2000, 
but stayed unchanged in 2000–2002. 
With imports, the one-fifth change in the 
similarity of trade structure between 
1993 and 2002 resulted from a rela-
tively constant annual change, which was 
the result of change in domestic demand 
as well. 
Changes in trade structure. Product 
groups taking high shares of Romania’s 
exports to the EU in 2002 were textiles, 
clothing and other textile articles (34.5 
per cent), machines and equipment (16), 
footwear, headgear, umbrellas and simi-
lar products (12), base metals and arti-
cles thereof (7), mineral products (5.4), 
and vehicles and associated transport 
equipment (5). The main structural 
changes – gains or losses in export 
shares to the EU in 1993–2002 – appear 
in Table B.3.4: machines and equipment 
(relative increase of 10 percentage 
points); footwear, headgear, umbrellas 
and similar products (almost 6); textiles 
and clothing (almost 3.5); vehicles and 
associated transport equipment (2.5); 
mineral products (relative decrease of -5 
percentage points); chemical products 
(more than -2); articles of stone, plastics, 
glass, cement, ceramics (more than -1.5). 
Overall exports of agricultural 
products doubled in 1993–2002, while 
imports were relatively stagnant; so that 
the shares reached 2.5 per cent and 4.3 
per cent respectively. These trade asym-
metries were smaller than the develop-
ment asymmetries revealed by the much 
higher share of the agricultural sector in 
Romania’s GDP (11 per cent) than of the 
EU’s (2 per cent). This negative correla-
tion suggests that the agricultural sector 
has not raised exports significantly in 
terms of reaping potential gains from the 
gradual asymmetric trade liberalization. 
Trade developments within Euro-
pean networks (production fragmenta-
tion) vs. developments in trade in com-
ponents (trade fragmentation). Romania 
has to face and take advantage of a 
globally unprecedented scale of interna-
tionalization of production processes, re-
sulting mainly in integration of trade 
and disintegration of production, with 
deep implications for the division of la-
bour. Identifying the lines of trade de-
velopment within networks sheds further 
light on assembly operations in Romania 
(vertical intra-industry trade: exchange of 
similar goods of different quality), while 
those related to developments in trade in 
components are essential for identifying 
Romania’s involvement in intra-production 
specialization (horizontal intra-industry 
trade: exchange of similar goods that 
are not differentiated in terms of qual-
ity). The main empirical finding was that 
intra-industry trade is predominant in 
the trade of the CEE countries with the 
EU. Within that, the vertical structures 
are overwhelming (80–90 per cent), with 
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strong quality advantages for the EU and 
shrinking quality advantages for CEE 
countries (Aturupane, Djnakov and 
Hoekman 1997; Kaminski and Ng 2001; 
Gabrisch and Segnana 2002).  
The broad pattern of Romania’s 
trade competitiveness relative to the EU 
may be traced using the RCA index and 
its dynamics (Table B.3.5). Although 
economists accept that international spe-
cialization along lines of comparative ad-
vantage is a positive-sum game, high 
changes in specialization will entail tran-
sitional adjustment costs. One empirical 
method of assessing the adjustment im-
plications of trade expansion is to ana-
lyse the dynamics of intra-industry trade 
indices with the Grubel–Lloyd Index. The 
widely held ‘smooth-adjustment hypothe-
sis’ states that a high proportion of the 
IGL value will be associated with rela-
tively low labour-market disruption, for 
with intra-industry adjustment, workers 
move within rather than between indus-
tries (Egger, Egger and Greenaway 
2004). So IGL values are often used to 
estimate intensity of structural-adjustment 
pressures from trade expansion (Table 
B.3.6). These pressures increased with the 
increase of trade with the EU until 2000 
(for adjusted IGL two-way flow, a rise 
from 0.55 in 1993 to 0.66 in 2000, but 
from 0.81 to 0.94 for unadjusted IGL). 
Thereafter, no trade expansion-derived 
structural adjustments occurred, the IGL 
being relatively stagnant in 2000 (unad-
justed 0.66) to 2002 (0.94). 
A low value of the unadjusted in-
dex usually implies low intra-industry 
exchange and rather significant inter-
industry trade, meaning that the country 
exports is mainly exporting goods in 
which it has a real comparative advan-
tage and importing commodities that are 
too expensive to produce at home (Table 
B.3.6; Figure B.3.7). This means that one-
way flow predominates over two-way 
flow. Such transactions derive, however, 
from enlargement of the range of com-
modity supplies in domestic markets. 
Similarly, if the index shows high values, 
the economy has high intra-industry 
trade, carried out on product diversifica-
tion based on trade in similar goods. 
This is associated with prevalence of 
two-way flow over one-way flow. In the 
former case, the inter-industry trade is 
mainly characterized by a high export 
complementarity of imports, while in the 
latter, exports are good substitutes for 
imports. As for Romania’s total trade 
with the EU, intra-industry trade pre-
vailed, increasing from 0.55 to 0.66, us-
ing the adjusted two-way trade IGL. 
However, the estimates have a high 
aggregation level (which should be ad-
dressed in further research), and the 
empirical relevance of the statistical 
methodology for measuring intra-industry 
trade is an issue. These are the main 
implications: 
* Most flows between imports and ex-
ports consist of both intra and inter-
industry trade. (An individual flow 
cannot be both simultaneously.) 
* Intra-industry trade is balanced in 
every sector, while inter-industry trade 
balances only across industries and is 
the sole cause of overall trade surplus 
or deficit. 
To avoid some of the latter short-
comings when measuring intra-industry 
trade, an overlap index (OI) was used 
for individual trade flows. Its high values 
give a view of the magnitude of the 
two-way flow trade; when associated 
with high IGL, it is mainly intra-industry 
trade; and conversely, the one-way flows 
associated with low IGL are mainly verti-
cal trade. 
Prevalence of two-way flows. This 
suggests lower relevance for comparative 
advantages at sectoral level, as an ex-
planation of trade (e.g. clothing and tex-
tiles, vegetal products and base metals 
and articles show relatively low positive 
comparative advantages and high intra-
industry trade indices). In this case, Ro-
mania and the EU produce and ex-
change similar but differentiated goods. 
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A high degree of similarity in the quality 
of traded goods (horizontal intra-industry 
trade and intra-production specialization) 
implies they are competitors in the mar-
kets and may raise concerns over com-
petitive pressures. But the prevalence of 
vertical flows in Romania’s case reduces 
the degree of similarity implied by 
weight of two-way flows and hence the 
competitive concerns, as individual prod-
ucts of different quality are not true 
competitors. In 2002, this was the case 
for: 
I. Live animals and animal products 
(low disadvantage). 
II. Vegetal products (positive, but low 
RCA).  
XI. Textiles and clothing (positive, but 
low RCA). 
XIII. Articles of stone, plastics, glass, 
cement, ceramics (low disadvan-
tage).  
XV. Base metals and articles (positive, 
but low RCA). 
XVI. Machines and equipment (low dis-
advantage). 
XVII. Vehicles and associated transport 
equipment (low disadvantage). 
Nonetheless, Romania is positioned 
at the lower end of the quality spectrum 
and can be adversely affected by compe-
tition from other countries producing 
low-quality, low-price goods (e.g. clothing 
and textiles from China). 
Prevalence of one-way flows. This 
implies comparative advantages, with 
Romania exporting or importing individ-
ual products and the EU having a dif-
ferent specialization. There was speciali-
zation and high RCA for Romania (rela-
tive to the EU) in these sectors in 2002 
(accounting for 26.9 per cent of exports 
to the EU and 4.8 per cent of imports):  
V. Mineral products. 
IX. Wood and wood products, other 
than furniture. 
XII. Footwear, headgear, umbrellas and 
similar products. 
XX. Miscellaneous manufactured articles, 
including furniture. 
All these had an RCA higher than 
+1.5 and an IGL equal to or lower than 
0.4. 
On the other hand, Romania has 
significant comparative disadvantages, 
Europe being highly specialized in trade 
in these product groups in 2002 (ac-
counting for 6.9 per cent of exports to 
the EU and 30.5 per cent of imports):  
IV. Food, beverages, tobacco. 
VI. Chemical products. 
VII. Plastics, rubber and articles 
thereof. 
VIII. Raw hides and skins, leather, furs 
and articles thereof. 
X. Pulp of wood, paper, paperboard. 
XVIII. Optical, photographic, cinemato-
graphic, medical or surgical in-
struments, clocks and musical in-
struments and components. 
XXII. Products not elsewhere included. 
All these had an RCA lower than  
-1.1, and an IGL between 0.2 and 0.45. 
In total Romanian trade with the 
EU, intra-industry trade prevailed, with 
66 per cent of two-way flow in balanced 
trade and almost 95 per cent in unbal-
anced over 2000–2002 (Table B.3.7). 
One-way flows predominated in exports 
of traditional sectors with major positive 
comparative advantages. Positive RCA 
explains 25 per cent of total export 
flows to the EU, and negative RCA 30 
per cent of total imports from the EU 
(Table B.3.8). 
Thus Romania trades a large share 
of the same type of goods, which implies 
a high level of specialization in assembly 
operations, based on labour-intensive 
comparative advantage within the context 
of international trade. Romania exports 
high-quality goods in traditional sectors 
(clothing, footwear, wood products, mis-
cellaneous manufactured articles and 
furniture, base metals, vegetal products) 
and relatively low quality goods in others 
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(e.g. machines and equipment, vehicles 
and associated transport equipment). 
Romanian exporters may still be hit by 
competition from emerging producers 
able to supply the same low quality at 
lower cost. A marked increase in spe-
cialization in technology-intensive prod-
ucts (machines and equipment, vehicles 
and associated transportation equipment) 
appeared over 1993–2002, but again in 
fairly labour-intensive production phases 
(Figure B.3.6). This scenario, however, 
evolves positively over time, as Romania 
moves towards a higher quality position-
ing in these sectors. (Table 4) 
 
Dynamically, the strong and weak 
sectors are grouped into four main 
groups according to the increase/de-
crease of intra-industry trade and RCAs 
(data computed from Tables B.3.4, B.3.5, 
and B.3.6 and Figures B.3.6 and B.3.7. 
The product groups in Table 5 witnessed 
a double increase in RCA and IGL. They 
accounted for 23.2 per cent of total ex-
ports to the EU and 36.5 per cent of 
imports in 2002. 
The fact that both RCA and IGL 
show positive evolutions between 1993 
and 2002 might be interpreted as pro-
duction-stage development, revealing a 
reallocation of production units by for-
eign suppliers to Romania, facilitating 
vertical integration. This is especially the 
case for machines and equipment and 
vehicles and associated transport equip-
ment. For despite the magnitude of the 
increase, they still face negative RCA. 
(However, the relevance of RCA in ex-
plaining the trade in these two sectors is 
very low.) But this is not the case for 
optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
medical or surgical instruments, clocks 
and musical instruments and compo-
nents, where even if driven by a 14 per 
cent outward processing-trade production 
index in 1999 (Turlea and Mereuta 
2004), one-way flows (2.3 per cent of 
total imports from the EU) still prevail 
over two-way flows (0.5 per cent of to-
tal exports to the EU). The decrease of 
negative RCA however explains the trade 
in the latter product group, as its share 
in total exports to the EU increased in 
2002 relative to 1993, and decreased in 
imports. A different pattern is revealed 
in the pulp, paper and paperboard 
products group, where the low decrease 
of negative RCA does not explain the 
higher increase in its share in imports 
than in exports. (Table 5) 
The product groups showing an in-
crease in RCA and a decrease in IGL 
account for 8.3 per cent of total exports 
to the EU and 1.8 per cent of imports in 
2002 (Table 6). 
Table 4
IARC, 1993–2002 
 
  Increase Decrease 
In
cr
ea
se
 
II. Vegetal prod-
ucts. X. Pulp of 
wood, paper, pa-
perboard. XVI. 
Machines and 
equipment. XVII. 
Vehicles and as-
sociated transport 
equipment. XVIII. 
Optical, photo-
graphic, cine-
matographic, 
medical or surgi-
cal instruments, 
clocks and musi-
cal instruments 
and components. 
IV. Food, beverages, 
tobacco. XIII. Arti-
cles of stone, plas-
tics, glass, cement, 
ceramics. XV. Base 
metals and articles. 
XX. Miscellaneous 
manufactured arti-
cles, incl. furniture. 
IG
L 
19
9
3–
20
0
2 
D
ec
re
as
e 
V. Mineral prod-
ucts IX. Wood 
and wood prod-
ucts, other than 
furniture 
I. Live animals and 
animal products III. 
Animal or vegetal 
fats and oil VI. 
Chemical products 
VII. Plastics, rubber 
and articles thereof 
VIII. Raw hides and 
skins, leather, furs 
and articles thereof 
XI. Textiles and tex-
tile articles XII. 
Footwear, headgear, 
umbrellas and other 
similar products 
XXII. Products not 
elsewhere (furniture 
included) 
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Table 5 
 
 II. Vegetal products 
X. Pulp of 
wood, paper, 
paperboard 
XVI. Machines 
and equipment
XVII. Vehicles 
and associated 
transport 
equipment 
XVIII. Optical, 
photographic, 
cinematographic, 
medical or surgi-
cal instruments, 
clocks and musi-
cal instruments 
and components
RCA change 1993–
2002 
2.17 - + 0.12 - - 1.04 - - 0.50 - - 0.69 - - 
IGL change 1993–
2002 
0.58 0.09 0.47 0.32 0.19 
Change in share in 
total exports to 
EU, 1993–2002 
-0.8 0.3 9.6 2.5 0.2 
Change in share in 
total imports from 
EU, 1993–2002 
-8.8 1.0 -3.4 1.2 -0.8 
Share in exports 
in 2002 
1 0.6 16.1 5 0.5 
Share in imports 
in 2002 
0.6 2.6 23.8 7.2 2.3 
 
 
 
Table 6 
  
 V. Mineral products IX. Wood and wood products, other than furniture 
RCA change 2002 vs. 1993 0.62 + + 0.34 + + 
IGL change 2002 vs. 1993 -0.36 -0.22 
Change in share in total exports to EU, 
1993–2002 
-5.3 0.8 
Change in share in total imports from 
EU, 1993–2002 
-3.3 0.0 
Share in exports in 2002 5.4 2.9 
Share in imports in 2002 1.2 0.6 
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These may be interpreted as a de-
crease in intra-industry trade, i.e. trade 
in similar products, with the EU; one-
way flows prevailed and increased in 
these two sectors. The high positive com-
parative advantages explain 4 times 
higher shares of these products in Ro-
mania’s exports than in imports from the 
EU.  
The product groups that showed a 
decrease in RCA and increase in IGL ac-
count for 15.6 per cent of total exports 
to the EU and 10.8 per cent of imports 
in 2002 (Table 7). 
The increase in IGL and decrease 
in RCA (the high share of this product 
group’s RCA being basically positive) 
might be explained by the use of trans-
fer pricing in intra-firm trade, especially 
with articles of stone, plastics, glass, ce-
ment and ceramics. Boscaiu et al. (2000) 
find that 46 per cent of export-oriented 
foreign firms operating in Romania made 
losses from export operations. The ce-
ment industry too is a perfect candidate 
for transfer pricing. All firms are for-
eign-owned. The local market is split be-
tween the same three foreign-owned 
firms that share the other market in the 
region. This contributes much to the low 
share of XIII product group in Roma-
nian foreign trade with the EU. A special 
case is the mainly domestically oriented 
foodstuff sector, which faces higher 
shares in imports from the EU than in 
exports to it and high negative RCAs. 
These are explained by an increase in 
demand and market-oriented FDI; Roma-
nian agriculture is a good supplier to 
the food industry. However, in miscella-
neous manufactured articles and furni-
ture, the high positive RCA eased over 
the decade, although this remains the 
most competitive product group relative 
to the EU (highest positive RCA in 2002 
and exports prevalent over imports). 
The product groups that showed a 
double decrease in RCA and IGL ac-
counted for 52.9 per cent of total ex-
ports to the EU and 50.7 per cent of 
imports in 2002 (Table 8). 
More than half Romania’s trade 
with the EU (exports and imports) faced 
decreasing comparative advantages and 
arises in intra-industry trade. Not sur-
prisingly, most of the low-skilled, labour-
intensive sectors are found here. How-
ever, the pattern of the latter was het-
erogeneous. Textiles and clothing and 
footwear still had positive RCAs and in-
creased their share in total exports to 
the EU. But the positive RCA was signifi-
cant and explained only the increase in 
the footwear products group, dominated 
by one-way flow trade, where the in-
crease in export share was much higher 
than in imports. With textile and cloth-
ing products, an important vehicle for 
trade integration was outward processing 
(the OPT production index in 1999 was 
86.3 per cent), which led to one of the 
highest shares of intra-industry trade. On 
the other hand, the increasingly negative 
RCA in the chemical, plastics, rubber, 
leather and articles thereof product 
group explained the prevalence and in-
crease of one-way trade flows: imports 
over exports in 2002. These were the 
main uncompetitive sectors in Romanian 
foreign trade. The two remaining sectors 
– live animals and animal products and 
products not included elsewhere – lost 
their initially positive RCA. But RCA is 
irrelevant in the former case. Two-way 
flows dominated over one-way flows. 
(The share in imports was higher than in 
exports in 2002.) But the increase in the 
negative RCA explains the prevalence of 
one-way flow and the higher increase in 
its share in imports than in exports. 
So positive RCAs in trade with the 
EU in 2002 were still located in labour-
intensive industries (Figure B.3.6) – mis-
cellaneous manufactured articles (furni-
ture included), footwear, headgear, um-
brellas and other similar products, wood 
and wood products, textiles and clothing, 
vegetal products – and in natural re-
source-intensive industries: mineral prod-
ucts and base metal and articles. These 
accounted for 70.5 per cent of total ex-
ports to the EU and 35.4 per cent of 
imports in that year. 
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Table 7 
 
 
IV. Food, bever-
ages, tobacco 
XIII. Articles of 
stone, plastics, 
glass, cement, 
ceramics 
XV. Base metals 
and articles 
XX. Miscellane-
ous manufac-
tured articles, 
incl. furniture 
RCA change 1993–2002  -0.09 -   - -1.02 +   - -0.74 +   + -0.31 +   + 
IGL change 1993–2002 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.01 
Change in share of sector in total 
exports to EU, 1993–2002 
-0.9 -1.5 -3.2 -7.8 
Change in share of sector in total 
imports from EU, 1993–2002 
-2.9 0.3 2.1 -1.2 
Share in exports in 2002 0.5 1.4 7.2 6.5 
Share in imports in 2002 1.7 1.5 6.9 0.7 
 
 
Table 8 
 
 
I. Live 
animals 
and animal 
products 
III. Animal 
or vegetal 
fats and 
oil 
VI. Chemi-
cal prod-
ucts 
VII. Plas-
tics, rub-
ber and 
articles 
thereof 
VIII. Raw 
hides and 
skins, 
leather, 
furs and 
articles 
thereof 
XI. Textiles 
and textile 
articles 
XII. Foot-
wear, 
headgear, 
umbrellas 
and other 
similar 
products 
XXII. 
Products 
not else-
where 
RCA change, 
1993–2002 
-1.09 +   
- 
-5.55 +   
- 
-1.04 -   - -0.42 -   - -0.49 -  
- 
-0.19 +   
+ 
-0.15 +  
+ 
-2.70 +  
- 
IGL change 
1993–2002 
-0.24 -0.95 -0.21 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.21 
Change in 
share of sec-
tor in total 
exports to EU, 
1993–2002 
-0.6 -0.7 -2.4 0.4 0.3 3.4 5.7 0.1 
Change in 
share of sec-
tor in total 
imports from 
EU, 1993–
2002 
0.7 0.0 0.3 2.9 2.9 5.9 1.3 1.4 
Share in ex-
ports in 2002 
1 0.0 1.3 2.2 1.6 34.4 12.1 0.3 
Share in im-
ports in 2002 
1.6 0.4 9.8 6.4 5.6 23.1 2.3 1.5 
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These conclusions are consistent 
with the international specialization ap-
proach, according to the Balassa revealed 
comparative advantage (BRCA) index, 
developed at a higher level of disaggre-
gation. The latter compares the share of 
a given sector in national exports with 
the share of this sector in world exports. 
According to International Trade Center 
(2004) evaluations, Romania was special-
ized in 2002 in leather products (rank-
ing in 8th in world export share, BRCA 
= 6.51), clothing (22nd, BRCA = 6.77), 
and basic manufactures (26th, BRCA = 
1.73). 
Romania is a weak competitor in 
technology-intensive industries, which 
generate more than half the trade deficit 
(Figure B.3.7). The highest sectoral trade 
deficit with the EU, in 2002, was still 
accounted for by the machines and 
equipment products group (almost USD 1 
million), followed by chemical products 
(USD 0.9 million). The international spe-
cialization index ranks Romania 35th in 
world export share in IT and consumer 
electronics (BRCA = 0.35); 36th in non-
electronic machinery (BRCA = 0.59); 
37th in electronic components (BRCA = 
0.65); 39th in transport equipment 
(BRCA 0 45); 40th in miscellaneous 
manufacturing (BRCA = 0.77) (Interna-
tional Trade Center 2004). 
In dynamic terms, Romania’s pro-
duction seems to be shifting towards 
higher quality. Romania’s labour-intensive 
export gains in European market shares 
partly result from reallocation of labour 
to technology-intensive industries in other 
CEE countries. In the medium run, la-
bour-intensive export industries will lose 
competitiveness, as labour costs gradually 
increase with deeper integration with the 
EU. Intra-industry flows account for two-
thirds of Romania’s exports to the EU. 
Meanwhile, comparative advantages ex-
plained a quarter of Romanian exports 
to the EU in 2002. The RCA relevance 
will also diminish after Romania’s entry 
into the EU, bringing free movement of 
production factors. Indeed, the margins 
of comparative advantage have shrunk 
already in a globalization context. 
It is no longer clear that compara-
tive advantages can be identified at 
broad sectoral level. Adjustments within 
sectors may be of greater importance 
than those between sectors, as interna-
tional specialization becomes tighter. Fur-
thermore, significant comparative advan-
tages may be found at the more disag-
gregated product, rather than product-
group level. This is one of the big short-
comings in Romanian trade specialization 
with the EU, to be addressed soon in 
greater depth as data becomes available. 
This analysis, however, has revealed 
the main competitiveness features of the 
Romanian business environment: the la-
bour force and natural resources. Find-
ing the incidence of development of 
trade performances and dynamics needs 
complementing with the inverse approach. 
The next section considers how liberaliza-
tion and trade expansion have affected 
development. 
The trade approach versus the 
development approach to 
convergence 
A few remarks are worth making here 
about the complex relationship between 
liberalization, especially trade liberaliza-
tion, and human development. Under-
standing the interaction between them 
calls for appreciation of the complexity 
of trade policy and human development 
as part of broader development policy. 
Though the relationship between trade 
and development is the subject of con-
tentious debate, there is little doubt that 
trade can be a powerful source of eco-
nomic growth (Rodrick 2002). But 
broadly based economic growth is a nec-
essary, but not the sole requirement for 
human development. Human development 
also requires enlargement of people’s 
choices and opportunities, especially those 
of the poor. International trade can ex-
pand markets, facilitate competition and 
disseminate knowledge, creating opportu-
nities for growth and human develop-
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ment. Trade can also raise productivity 
and increase exposure to new technolo-
gies, which can again spur growth. In-
deed, over the past 20 years, the fastest-
growing regions have also had the high-
est export growth (World Bank 2002). 
But liberalizing trade does not ensure 
human development, and expanding 
trade does not always have a positive or 
neutral effect on human development. 
Trade expansion neither guarantees im-
mediate economic growth or longer-run 
economic or human development (WTO 
2003). Internal and external institutional 
and social pre-conditions largely deter-
mine whether and to what extent a 
country or population group benefit 
from trade. Trade in any case should be 
seen as a means to development rather 
than an end. Although there is a two-
way relationship between trade and hu-
man development, trade theories do not 
offer unequivocal conclusions about the 
directions or dynamics of the relation-
ship. Moreover, trade liberalization poli-
cies should not be viewed as a reliable 
mechanism for generating self-sustaining 
growth and reducing poverty, let alone 
achieving other positive human develop-
ment outcomes (Dollar and Kraay 2000). 
Significant real annual growth in 
GDP coincided with two cycles of liber-
alization measures in Romania (foreign 
trade included). The first was performed 
in the early years of transition (mainly 
structural and institutional reforms) and 
followed by a drastic fall of the EBRD 
index in 1995–7. The second was under-
taken in late 1996 to 1998 (macroeco-
nomic adjustment reforms being pre-
dominant) and followed by a steady in-
crease in the EBRD index and in 
GDP/head (PPC) as well (Figures C.1 and 
C.2). The high GDP growth rate since 
2000 has been associated with a still 
higher export increase rate and a steady 
rise in GDP per capita – measured in 
Euros and in PPC (see Figure C.2). 
The greater the scope of reforms – 
including liberalization of the economy 
and a greater private-sector share of 
GDP – the better the economy will per-
form and the higher the real GDP levels 
it will attain. Romania is an under-
performer in terms of economic liberali-
zation, but it had faster real GDP 
growth in 1991–2001 than Lithuania, 
Latvia or Bulgaria (Figure C.3). This is in 
line with the conclusion of Funcke and 
Ruhwedel (2003) that economic policy as 
reflected in the aggregate EBRD transi-
tion indicator has significantly contrib-
uted to productivity recovery in Eastern 
Europe, and this is reflected in higher 
GDP growth. In other words, government 
policies in a wide range of areas are 
important in explaining both the time 
and cross-sectional dimensions of output 
paths during the transition. 
Poland has been the best performer 
of the CEE 10 in terms of real GDP 
growth (1989=100), although Hungary 
and the Czech Republic were more lib-
eralized economies in the same period. 
Hungary has been the best performer in 
terms of lower income inequality. The 
faster liberalization process was associ-
ated with a smaller increase in earnings 
inequality, measured by the Gini Coeffi-
cient of income per capita. Romania has 
a relatively close average value of EBRD 
liberalization to Bulgaria, but the latter 
experienced a far higher increase in in-
come inequality (Figure C.4). 
In explaining differences in CEE 
outcomes in terms of growth rates, the 
main explanatory factors have proved to 
be initial conditions, trade performance, 
external developments (access to markets, 
EU integration, etc.), geographical loca-
tion (proximity to EU border), and ex-
tent and nature of market reforms, at 
macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. 
The degree of political competitiveness of 
CEE countries is also reflected strongly in 
the degree of economic liberalization. 
Relatively democratic countries, like the 
new CEE 8 members of the EU, liberal-
ized their economies faster and more 
thoroughly. Romania’s centralized political 
regime left the transition to a market 
economy at a lower average level on the 
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liberalization index in 1991–2001 than 
the CEE 10 group analysed here (Figure 
C.5). Hungary, Czech Republic and Po-
land are the best performers among the 
CEE 10, but the others are close behind 
them, except for Bulgaria and Romania. 
Finally, the rule of law and corrup-
tion are two phenomena that distort eco-
nomic growth and income distribution. 
The transition economies can be divided 
into four main groups in terms of cur-
rent level of taxation and corruption 
(Figure C.6). The moderate GDP percent-
ages of Romanian government outlays, 
the lowest of any of the CEE 10, are 
associated with the weakest rule of law 
index and the highest corruption percep-
tion index among the accession countries. 
So a stronger rule of law is crucial to 
longer-term economic growth. This is 
proved by the experience of three out-
performers: Slovenia, Hungary and Esto-
nia – countries with strong to very 
strong rule of law and moderate corrup-
tion perception scores. 
3) THE GROWTH COMPETI-
TIVENESS CONVERGENCE INDEX 
The range of explanatory variables for 
economic growth and development cause 
uncertainty about growth projections in 
estimates of CEE convergence to the EU 
(GDP per capita or hard macroeconomic 
data such as the Deutsche Bank method-
ology) and the estimated number of 
years needed to catch up with the EU 
average. The ambiguity is exacerbated in 
Romania’s case by uncertainty about how 
much the country can reasonably be ex-
pected to converge. This statistical ap-
proach may lead to implausible conclu-
sions, as convergence is a complex proc-
ess involving the macroeconomic envi-
ronment, public institutions, and national 
technology upgrading. The economic ro-
bustness of convergence analysis may be 
improved by quantifying all these eco-
nomically important explanatory variables 
in a composite growth competitiveness 
convergence index. To do so, indices es-
timated in Blanke, Paua and Sala-i-
Martin 2004 have been used. 
An immediate overview of the 2003 
results for the index for 2003 reveals 
significant differences between Romania 
and the EU, and between Romania and 
other CEE countries (Table D.1). Romania 
had the lowest growth competitiveness 
convergence to the EU and the CEE 10 
index in 2003 (66.0 and 77.5 per cent 
respectively. Relative to the EU, Romania 
lags especially in country credit rating 
(40.3 per cent), government waste (44.5 
per cent), contracts and law (55.5 per 
cent), innovation (57.8 per cent) and 
corruption (58.8 per cent). These analy-
ses show the areas for Romania to ad-
dress, if it is to approximate to the av-
erage EU development level. Higher con-
vergence is registered in terms of tech-
nology transfer (97.3 per cent, better 
than Bulgaria or Lithuania) and macro-
economic stability (80.0 per cent). 
A closer look at the EU and CEE 
10 averages shows slightly higher stan-
dard deviation and far higher dispersion 
(s-convergence) in the latter. This reflects 
that the CEE 10 are more heterogeneous 
than the EU (Table D.2). Estonia, Slovenia 
and Hungary are the out-performers for 
growth competitiveness convergence to 
the EU and Romania and Bulgaria the 
laggards. The high dispersion within the 
CEE 10 is caused by scores for govern-
ment waste reduction (21.0 per cent dis-
persion), contracts and law enforcement 
(17.1 per cent), country credit improve-
ments (16.2 per cent) and innovation 
(14.2 per cent). In the EU 15, the disper-
sion comes mainly from innovation per-
formance (20.4 per cent dispersion) and 
government waste reduction (19.2 per 
cent). 
According to the indicator of 
growth competitiveness convergence to 
the EU and to the Deutsche Bank con-
vergence indicators, Romania ranks last 
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among the CEE 10 (Table D.3), but 9th 
for business environment and GDP per 
capita convergence indicator. The ratings 
of other CEE countries show some differ-
ences from their ratings for GDP per 
capita. Estonia comes first, followed by 
Slovenia, Hungary and Latvia (Table 
D.3). However, comparing the four 
methodologies used for CEE convergence 
to the EU (Table D.3) – the growth 
competitiveness convergence indicator 
(IGC), business environment convergence 
indicator (BCI), Deutsche Bank conver-
gence indicator (DB) and GDP per capita 
– reveals strong positive correlations be-
tween the rankings: 
Indicators Correlation 
IGC _ BCI 0.93 
DB _ GDP per capita 0.85 
IGC _ DB 0.70 
DB _ BCI 0.70 
IGC _ GDP per capita 0.65 
Scenarios for the CEE 10 to catch 
up with the EU  
Finally, let us compare the results of two 
scenarios, looking at the number of 
years the CEE 10 would need to reach 
the EU average for GDP per capita and 
growth competitiveness. Let us take a 2.5 
per cent annual reduction of the gap 
between the CEE countries and the EU as 
an optimistic scenario and a 2 per cent 
reduction for the pessimistic scenario 
(Table D.4). These convergence speeds 
are close to the historical estimates of EU 
and CEEC convergence speeds made by 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Kaitila 
(1994) and Wagner and Hlouskova 
(2004) (see section 2 regarding the main 
empirical evidence). For the latter, we 
suggest a lower speed of annual reduc-
tion as it involves a holistic improvement 
of the economic environment, which is 2 
per cent for the optimistic scenario, and 
1.5 per cent for the pessimistic scenario 
(Table D.5). There are no empirical find-
ings on the speed of convergence in GCI, 
as there are no long-term data. 
Predictions suggest that the catch-
up with the EU average in GDP per 
capita will take over three decades at 
the very least, according to the optimistic 
scenario, and six decades according to 
the pessimistic scenario. Slovenia will ar-
rive first, followed by the Czech Republic 
and Hungary. But Romania will need 60 
years according to the optimistic scenario 
and 110 years under the pessimistic sce-
nario. If the pessimistic scenario is taken 
to be more likely, Romania will reach 
only 60 per cent of the EU average for 
GDP per capita over the next 30 years. 
 In terms of growth competitive-
ness, the predictions suggest much less 
time needed for CEE catch-up, except 
for Romania, which lags behind. The op-
timistic scenario yields four years and 
the pessimistic two decades. Estonia ar-
rives first in this case, followed by Slo-
venia and Hungary. (The Czech Republic 
is expected to come fifth for GCI, as 
opposed to second for GDP per capita.) 
Romania will need 75 years according to 
the optimistic scenario or 135 according 
to the pessimistic. 
 These linear projections are theo-
retical and mechanistic, but if a con-
stant, unique and ‘uncalibrated’ conver-
gence pattern is assumed for all CEE 
countries, they provide a general idea of 
the long-term process of convergence 
required. They also give indications for 
economic policy-makers about the speed 
of reform and growth they need to in-
duce in order to catch up earlier. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has covered a wide terrain, 
with the main aim of providing in-depth 
estimations of the magnitude of CEE 
convergence on the EU. 
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Theoretical implications. The quanti-
tative approach to revealing the gaps 
between the CEE countries and the EU 
with the qualitative aspect in the hetero-
geneous pattern of the CEEC convergence 
process to the EU by estimating the 
growth competitiveness convergence in-
dex. We focused on the impact of initial 
conditions on growth and convergence 
and on the pressures of the market 
opening and integration processes, but 
we mainly pointed to the role of nation-
ally specific differences in growth and 
business environment performances. In 
order to have a digestible form of these 
differences we found it useful and rele-
vant to oppose the development approach 
and the trade approach in explaining the 
differences in convergence speed, as 
proxies for the outcomes of macroeco-
nomic or microeconomic reforms. Ex-
plaining the interactions between the two 
as well, we overcame the limitations of 
the traditional approaches, focused on 
shrinking gaps in GDP/per capita or 
core macroeconomic data in estimating 
the convergence level of CEE countries to 
the EU (Deutsche Bank methodology). 
The literature reviewed in the first 
section demonstrates that trade matters 
to growth. Either divergence or conver-
gence is a possible outcome of the eco-
nomic development process. But the 
stress on the vast typology of differences 
between Romania and other CEE coun-
tries is highly pertinent to understanding 
the interactions that lead Romania to dif-
ferent patterns of specialization and a 
lower convergence speed to the EU. Dif-
ferent waves of development have been 
dominated by different industries. High 
technology has been exploited unevenly 
by the CEE 10 countries during the tran-
sition, again according to their speciali-
zation patterns. Romania is highly spe-
cialized in labour-intensive and natural 
resource-intensive industries, in the first 
stage of competitive development: the 
factor-driven economy. The shift towards 
the second, investment-driven stage based 
on efficiency has improved in the last 
three years, but remains rather modest.  
Recent research into the relation 
between trade and growth suggests that 
openness alone is an insufficient determi-
nant of high levels of growth, though a 
country’s trade performance may be a 
good indicator of economic performance 
– good performers tend to record higher 
rates of GDP growth. Many other fac-
tors can be identified as important forces 
leading to lag. These, gathered in the 
two main groups of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic growth competitiveness, 
improve convergence-methodology estima-
tions. There is still room for improve-
ment, however, as the qualitative ap-
proach, developed as a complement to 
the quantitative approach in offering a 
general profile of degree of convergence, 
can be criticized for its small number of 
variables.  
Policy implications. Convergence can 
certainly not be taken for granted. The 
transition of the CEE countries to a new 
stage of development – as economies 
driven by the innovation on which the 
EU focuses – is very hard, calling for 
complex transformation of many interde-
pendent aspects of competition. Policy-
makers generally focus on aspects of 
macroeconomic quality, but they also 
need to address microeconomic reforms 
as qualitative indicators to gauge the 
competitiveness of nations. They should 
not underestimate the way the wealth or 
standard of living of a nation is created 
at the microeconomic level, in the na-
tional business environment. If capabilities 
there fail to improve, macroeconomic, 
political, legal and social reforms cannot 
succeed either. The challenges are still 
hard to meet, as the CEE countries must 
compete with the EU 15, despite having 
economies at different levels of develop-
ment. At the same time, they are poised 
to join the EU’s strong institutional and 
legal systems. Romania lags behind less 
in macroeconomic stability than in terms 
of national business environment and 
public institutional development: contracts 
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and law enforcement, corruption percep-
tion, and government waste. These are 
the main points that need addressing. 
The proposed convergence-methodology 
estimation will help to monitor on-going 
implementation of these policies. 
 
* * * * * 
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APPENDICES 
 
A) Development approach on CEEC convergence to EU 
 
A.1. Economic structures 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1.1. 
Employment in industry (% of total employment): 
over-industrialization relative to comparable emerging markets, 1989 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
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Figure A.1.2. 
Value added in industry (% of GDP): 
over-industrialization relative to comparable emerging markets, 1989 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
 
 
 
Figure A.1.3. 
Change in labour productivity in industry, 1992–2001 
(1992=100) 
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Source: EBRD Transition Report 2002. 
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Figure A.1.4. 
Employment in agriculture as % of total employment, 1989 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
 
 
 
Figure A.1.5. 
Value added in agriculture as % of GDP, 1989 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
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Figure A.1.6. 
Foreign debt in pre-transition year: 1989–1991, 
and for non-transition countries: 1989 
(% of GDP) 
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Source: Orlowski L., Transition and growth in post-communist countries, 2001; World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators 2003. 
 
Figure A.1.7. 
Scale of trade dependence on COMECON markets, 1990 
(% of GDP) 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2000. 
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Figure A.1.8. 
Degree of infrastructure development: telephone main line 
subscribers per 1000 population, 1989 
8
2
.3
8
8
.0
10
0
.9
12
7
.8
15
1.
1
19
7
.6
19
9
.7
2
2
1.
9
2
2
5
.0
4
9
.8
5
7
.5
2
7
7
.7
37
5
.4
39
6
.9
2
1.
6
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
350.0
400.0
Po
la
nd
H
u
ng
ar
y
R
om
an
ia
Sl
ov
ak
ia
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
bl
ic
Es
to
ni
a
Li
th
u
an
ia
Bu
lg
ar
ia
La
tv
ia
T
ha
ila
nd
C
hi
le
M
ex
ic
o
K
or
ea
G
re
ec
e
Eu
ro
zo
ne
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
 
Figure A.1.9. 
General government expenditure, 1989–2002 
(% of GDP) 
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Source: EBRD Transition Report 2003; OECD Economic Outlook 73. 
 
  
57
Figure A.1.10. 
Public expenditure on social security and welfare, 1989–2001 
(% of GDP) 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
A.2. Macroeconomic imbalances 
Figure A.2.1. 
Inflation, 1989 
(% of annual average) 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
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Figure A.2.2. 
Repressed inflation, 1987–1990 
(% of annual average) 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
 
Figure A.2.3. 
Inflation, 2002 
(annual average, %) 
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Source: EBRD Transition Report 2002; World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2003. 
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Figure A.2.4. 
Black market premium (% the official exchange rate), 1989 
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Source: De Melo et al., 1997. 
 
 
Figure A.2.5. 
Annual real exchange-rate appreciation (-) or depreciation (+) in Romania, 1992–2002 
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Source: National Bank of Romania Statistics, 2004. 
 
Annual average of real appreciation:
ROL/USD – 5.35; ROL/EURO – 8.06 
ROL/basket – 6.96. 
 
Change 2002 vs. 1992: 
ROL/USD – 54.50; ROL/EURO – 90.58 
ROL/basket – 76.36. 
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Figure A.2.6. 
Bank-dominated financial sectors: domestic credit to private sector, 
and market capitalization of listed companies, 2001 
(% of GDP) 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2004. 
A.3. FDI attractiveness 
Figure A.3.1. 
Cumulative per-capita FDI inflows, 1989–2002 
(USD) 
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Source: EBRD Transition Report Update, May 2003. 
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Figure A.3.2. 
Cumulative FDI inflows, 1989-2002 
(USD billion) 
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Source: EBRD Transition Report Update, May 2003. 
A.4. Economic growth  
Figure A.4.1. 
Economic growth: real GDP, 2002 
(1989 = 100) 
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Source: EBRD Transition Report Update, May 2003. 
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Figure A.4.2. 
Convergence of GDP/capita 
(2001, UEM = 100) 
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Source: European Commission EEAG Report 2004; Wagner, M. and J. Hlouskova, 2004. 
 
A.5. Human capital 
Figure A.5.1. 
Infant mortality per 1000 live births, 1990–2001 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2004; EBRD Transition Reports. 
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Figure A.5.2. 
Life expectancy at birth, 1990–2002 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004; EBRD Transition Reports. 
 
 
Figure A.5.3. 
Living standards: number of passenger cars per 1000 population, 1990 and 1999 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
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Figure A.5.4. 
Income distribution: Gini coefficient of income per capita, 1987–90 and 1996–8 
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Source: World Bank, Transition: The First Ten Years, 2002. 
A.6. Socio-political development 
Figure A.6.1. 
Political systems in transition economies, 1990–1999 
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Source: Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.com, 2002 
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A.7. Growth competitiveness 
Figure A.7.1. 
Growth Competitiveness Index and its components, 2003 
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Source: Based on estimations of Blanke, J., F. Pauna and X. Sala-i-Martin, 2004. 
 
 
Figure A.7.2. 
Growth competitiveness in Romania relative to CEE 10, mean, 2003 
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Source: Author’s computations based on the World Economic Forum estimates, 2004. 
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B) Trade approach to CEE convergence 
 
B.1. Specific aspects of trade performance of CEE countries 
relative to the EU 
 
 
 
Figure B.1.1. 
GDP and trade developments in transition economies and EU, 1995–2002 
(annual percentage change) 
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* Transition economies are grouped by WTO into Central and Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia); the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania); CIS 
(Armenia, Azerbaijian, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Moldova, Russian Fed., Tajikistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan). 
Source: World Trade Organization, 2004. 
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Figure B.1.2. 
FDI inflows into transition economies vs. Latin America, 2000–2002 
(USD billion) 
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Source: World Investment Reports, 2003. 
 
Figure B.1.3. 
Comparisons of average annual export growth rates (1995–2002), 
simple average MFN tariff (2001), GDP per capita (2002) 
and stock of FDI per capita (2003) in EU and accession countries 
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Source: WTO and WIIW databases, 2004. 
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Figure B.1.4. 
Exports of manufactures and share in total merchandise 
exports of CEE countries, 1990–2002 
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* Exports in 1995 instead of 1990; 
a
 Includes significant exports from processing zones. 
Source: World Trade Organization statistics, 2004. 
 
Figure B.1.5. 
Structural changes in exports of CEE countries, 
EU and world level, 2002 and 1995 
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* For Slovakia, the share of agricultural products in total merchandise exports in 1995 is lacking. 
Source: World Trade Organization statistics, 2004. 
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Table B.1.1. 
Specific aspects of trade performances in accession countries, 1990–2002 
 
Foreign trade in manufactures and services, 1995–2002 
USD million USD % % % % 
Total trade 
(exports + 
imports) 
Trade per 
capita 
(average, ex-
ports + im-
ports) 
Export 
growth rate
Annual average 
export growth 
rate 
Import 
growth rate 
Annual av-
erage im-
port growth 
rate 
2000 - 2002 2000 - 2002 2002 1995-2002 2002 1995-2002
Transition economies 336,3 869 10 7 11 6 
 Poland 53,3 1379 14 9 12 7 
 Czech Republic 41,3 4031 15 9 13.6 6.4 
 Slovakia 16,0 2972 14 8 12 9 
 Hungary 39,1 3841 13 15 12 14 
 Romania 15,7 1357 17 10 12 11 
 Bulgaria  8,31 1024 12 1 9 5 
 
Exports of manufactures, 1990–2002 
Value 
(USD million) 
Share of manufacture in total 
merchandise exports (%)  
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 1990 1995 2002 
World 2391,00 3702,00 4685,00 4514,00 4708,00 70.4 73.8 75.1 
 Poland 8,47 16,27 25,32 29,09 33,60 59.1 71.0 81.9 
 Czech Republic - 17,73 25,55 29,77 34,51 - 83.1 89.9 
 Slovakia - 6,98 9,92 10,58 12,23 - 81.3 85.1 
 Hungary 6,28 8,70 24,49 26,39 30,02 62.8 67.6 87.4 
 Romania 3,60 6,12 7,95 9,19 11,24 72.6 77.4 81.1 
 Bulgaria  ... 3,10 2,82 3,15 3,61 … 57.9 62.9 
EU (15) 1203,33 1667,64 1901,18 1911,36 2002,74 79.8 80.0 81.8 
Intra-export 771,74 1027,52 1154,71 1145,65 1190,28 78.8 77.0 78.9 
Extra-export 431,60 640,12 746,47 765,71 812,46 81.6 85.4 86.5 
 
Agricultural products (food and raw materials), 1990–2002 
Value 
(Mil. USD ) 
Share of agricultural exports in 
total merchandise exports (%)  
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 1990 1995 2002 
World 414610 583000 552240 554130 582530 12.2 11.6 9.3 
 Poland 2268 3036 3050 3392 3670 15.8 13.3 8.9 
 Czech Republic - 2072 1901 1942 2049 - 9.7 5.3 
 Slovakia - - - - - - - - 
 Hungary 2558 3054 2445 2747 2774 25.6 23.7 8.1 
 Romania 184 783 829 840 881 3.7 9.9 6.4 
 Bulgaria  ... 1304 605 605 812 ... 24.4 14.1 
EU (15) 175847 238990 218592 218091 233732 11.7 11.5 9.5 
Intra-export 130571 174405 159790 160038 170270 13.3 13.1 11.3 
Extra-exports 45276 64585 58900 58053 63462  8.6 6.8 
Source: World Trade Organization, 2004 
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Table B.1.2. 
Specific aspects of trade performance of accession countries on product group: 
clothing, textiles and automotive products, 1990–2002 
 
Value (USD million) Share in economy’s total merchandise exports (%) Clothing exports 
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 1990 2002a 
World 108100 158300 196780 195030 200850 3.2 3.3 
 Poland 384 2304 1884 1949 1915 2.7 5.4 
 Czech Republic - 515 634 652 645 - 2.0 
 Slovakia - 257 516 573 633 - 4.5 
 Hungary 375 1032 1221 1342 1296 3.8 4.4 
 Romania 363 1360 2328 2774 3251 7.3 24.4 
 Bulgaria  ... 236 698 793 1066 ... 15.5 
 Lithuania … 205 482 523 574 7.6* 10.3 
 Slovenia … 659 390 377 327 7.9* 3.4 
UE (15) 40782 48458 47421 47088 50452 2.7 2.1 
Intra-export 29444 33518 32733 31335 23860 3.0 2.2 
Extra-export 11338 14940 14688 15753 16592 2.1 1.8 
 
Value (USD million) Share in economy’s total merchandise exports (%) Textiles exports 
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 1990 1995 2002a 
World 104330 151580 154740 146980 1521150 3.1 3.0 2.4 
 Poland 284 512 769 796 908 2.0 2.2 2.2 
 Czech Republic - 1323 1218 1325 1368 - 6.2 3.6 
 Slovakia - 375 319 341 388 - 4.4 2.7 
 Hungary 249 286 371 408 456 2.5 2.2 1.3 
 Romania 125 178 196 241 310 2.5 2.3 2.2 
 Bulgaria  ... 173 121 117 125 … 3.2 2.2 
 Latvia  119 105 118 131  9.1 5.7 
 Lithuania … 163 212 207 227 … 6.0 4.1 
 Slovenia  322 286 330 355  3.9 3.7 
UE (15) 50795 62198 52923 51575 52052 3.4 3.0 2.1 
Intra-export 35672 40218 31246 29419 28937 3.6 3.0 1.9 
Extra-export 15123 21980 21677 22156 23115 2.9 2.9 2.5 
 
Value (USD million) Share in economy’s total merchandise exports (%) 
Automotive 
products exports 
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 1990 1995 2002a 
World 318960 456420 576750 569480 620920 9.4 9.1 9.9 
 Poland 374 996 3973 4228 5192 2.6 4.4 12.7 
 Czech Republic - 1509 4665 5521 6403 - 7.1 16.7 
 Slovakia - 344 2394 2273 2805 - 4.0 19.5 
 Hungary 648 659 4765 5323 5983 6.5 5.1 17.4 
 Romania 354 153 195 236 338 7.1 1.9 2.4 
 Bulgaria  - - - - - - - - 
 Lithuania - 91 126 282 564 - 3.4 10.1 
 Slovenia - 970 1075 1083 1312 - 11.7 13.9 
UE (15) 171579 235523 270116 275787 303297 11.4 11.3 12.4 
Intra-export 125828 166324 186735 188227 201724 12.8 12.5 13.4 
Extra-export 45751 69199 83381 87560 101573 8.6 9.2 10.8 
* Refers to 1995. a The closest year. 
Source: World Trade Organization, 2004. 
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Figure B.1.6. 
Romania’s nominal total foreign trade (USD million), 1993–2003 
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Source: Romanian National Bank statistics, 2003. 
 
 
Figure B.1.7. 
Trade asymmetries between Romania and EU: simple average MFN tariffs, 2002 
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Source: European Commission report on the Romania’s progress to EU accession, Brussels, 10.11.2003. 
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Figure B.1.8. 
Trade openness in CEE countries and the EU, 1995 and 2002 
(X+M/GDP, %) 
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Source: Author’s computations based on EUROSTAT statistics, 2004. 
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Figure B.1.9. 
FDI intensity (FDI flows/GDP) vs. Trade openess in the CEEC and EU (%), 2002 
 
 
 
Source: EUROSTAT statistics, 2004. 
 
 
Figure B.1.10. 
Total FDI and trade intensity/openness dynamics in Romania, 1993–2002, % 
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FDI intensity = average of inward and outward FDI flows divided by gross domestic product. Trade 
intensity = average of imports and exports of the item goods of the balance of payments divided by 
GDP. 
Source: EUROSTAT statistics, 2004. 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Trade intensity (%)
FD
I 
in
te
ns
ity
 (
%
) 
EU-25 
Bulgaria 
Romania 
Poland
Latvia Lithuania
Slovenia
Hungary
EU-15
Estonia 
Czech Republic
Slovakia 
  
74 
B.2. Business environment in CEE countries 
Table B.2.1. 
Business Competitiveness Index in CEE countries, 1998–2003 
 
BCI ranking in a sample 
of 80 countries 
Company operations 
and strategy ranking 
Quality of the national business 
environment ranking Country 
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998
GDP per 
capita 
ranking 
GDP per 
capita (PPP- 
adjusted) 
Estonia 28 30 28 — — — 36 36 32 — — — 27 28 26 — — — 33 11,712 
Latvia 29 45 41 — — — 29 48 35 — — — 31 42 42 — — — 42 8,965 
Slovenia 30 27 32 — — — 27 26 28 — — — 34 27 35 — — — 27 17,748 
Czech Republic 35 34 34 34 41 30 33 34 41 41 55 31 38 34 31 34 36 33 29 15,148 
Hungary 38 28 27 32 33 31 45 29 33 34 36 39 37 29 25 31 33 31 30 13,129 
Lithuania 40 40 50 — — — 41 39 47 — — — 41 39 47 — — — 38 10,015 
Slovakia 42 42 40 36 48 36 44 43 57 31 51 40 42 40 36 36 47 37 31 12,426 
Poland 46 46 42 41 37 41 43 46 55 36 38 38 44 45 40 41 38 40 36 10,187 
Romania 67 67 61 — — — 72 69 63 — — — 64 64 60 — — — 49 6,909 
Bulgaria 68 68 68 55 54 — 73 72 70 54 52 — 67 63 65 54 54 — 53 6,326 
* Porter’s 2002 GDP rankings and PPP-adjusted values for Bulgaria and Romania have been altered to conform with national, WIIW and European Commission sta-
tistics. 
Source: Porter, M., 2004. 
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B.3. Romanian trade pattern with EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.3.1. 
Specific aspects of trade performance of accession countries with EU: export and import 
growth and geographical concentration index with EU 15, 1990–2002 
 
Exports EU: 
Exports growth: 
1995–1990 
Exports growth: 
2002–1995 
Territorial concentration index with 
EU-15* in 2002 
 
(%) Ranking (%) Ranking (%) Rank 
Hungary 180.39 5. 445.07 1. 25.62 2. 
Czech Republic 193.47 4. 392.84 2. 31.08 1. 
Slovakia   377.23 3. 24.26 5. 
Lithuania   366.13 4. 16.27 9. 
Latvia   336.95 5. 17.22 8. 
Estonia    322.01 6. 21.77 7. 
Romania 217.60 2. 294.36 7. 21.97 6. 
Poland 208.83 3. 244.28 8. 25.26 3. 
Bulgaria 250.00 1. 220.00 9. 15.82 10. 
Slovenia   150.99 10. 24.56 4. 
 
Imports from EU: 
Imports growth: 
1995–1990 
Imports growth: 
2002–1995 
Territorial concentration index with 
EU 15* in 2002  
(%) Ranking (%) Ranking (%) Ranking 
Lithuania    347.39 1. 18.78 7. 
Slovakia    345.18 2. 24.54 2. 
Latvia    328.41 3. 16.43 10. 
Hungary 219.17 3. 309.40 4. 23.34 3. 
Romania 231.9 2. 273.43 5. 21.31 4. 
Czech Repub-
lic 
197.32 4. 264.27 6. 31.86 1. 
Bulgaria 113.87 5. 264.15 7. 16.79 9. 
Poland 395.61 1. 251.58 8. 20.19 5. 
Estonia     229.23 9. 16.86 8. 
Slovenia    154.48 10. 19.12 6. 
* The territorial concentration index is relative to the EU 15 as partners, using the Hirschmann concen-
tration ratio: TCI exp= ∑(xi/X)
2 and TCI imp = ∑(mi/M)
2, i = 1,..., 15 where: xi = share of exports to the 
EU country i in the total exports to EU; mi = share of imports from the EU country i in the total im-
ports from EU. 
Source: Author’s computations based on EUROSTAT statistics: External and intra-European Union trade, 
2003 and 2004. 
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Figure B.3.1. 
CEE countries’ export growth to EU, 1995–2002, 
compared with the EU countries’ concentration index, 2002 
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Source: Author’s computations based on Table B.3.1. 
 
 
Figure B.3.2. 
Romania’s trade intensity with the EU, 1993–2003 
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* Trade intensity is estimated as: TI = (xEU/XR)/(mEU/MW), i.e. share of Romanian exports to EU share 
of EU imports in world imports. 
Source: Author’s computations based on EUROSTAT statistics: External and Intra-European Trade, 2004. 
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Table B.3.2. 
Geographical trade concentration and shares of main country groups in Romania’s foreign trade, 1988–2003 
 
Merchandise exports Merchandise imports 
 Geographical concen-
tration of exports  
(HEXP, %) 
EU EFTA European transition economies CEFTA
Russian 
Federation
Geographical concentra-
tion of imports  
(HIMP, %) 
EU EFTA European transition economies CEFTA
Russian  
Federation 
1988 - 28.49 - 19.17 - 21.74 - 13.77 - 24.66 - 31.58 
1989 - 32.91 - 17.41 - 22.64 - 13.85 - 22.08 - 31.48 
1990 - 33.88 - 15.67 - 24.62 - 21.78 - 17.89 - 23.12 
1991 30.16 36.94 1.70 33.18 5.66 22.71 22.78 28.72 2.32 28.99 6.36 17.84 
1992 25.60 35.17 2.39 24.77 3.68 9.50 27.42 41.28 2.13 26.24 5.07 12.75 
1993 30.90 41.36 2.59 14.97 3.12 4.51 28.96 45.31 2.48 21.19 3.99 11.72 
1994 34.34 48.20 0.91 13.21 4.20 3.37 31.41 48.21 2.31 22.99 3.92 13.84 
1995 39.15 54.15 0.98 10.37 3.17 2.00 32.53 50.45 2.26 21.16 4.69 11.96 
1996 40.08 56.51 0.82 11.01 3.64 2.03 34.21 52.35 1.87 21.02 4.73 12.52 
1997 38.91 56.55 1.28 12.60 4.07 2.97 34.48 52.51 1.47 21.60 5.69 12.02 
1998 46.31 64.53 1.22 10.60 4.44 0.98 39.38 57.69 1.34 21.11 8.79 8.97 
1999 46.84 65.54 1.16 11.08 7.03 0.55 41.58 60.67 1.37 18.19 9.21 6.67 
2000 44.86 63.84 0.98 13.21 8.18 0.86 37.98 56.60 1.40 20.49 9.21 8.58 
2001 49.21 67.81 1.12 11.10 7.09 0.73 38.73 57.35 1.29 20.36 9.88 7.61 
2002 48.71 67.06 1.35 9.25 6.36 0.29 39.60 58.37 1.15 19.70 9.92 7.20 
2003 - 67.70 - - 7.30 - - 57.70 - - 10.70 - 
* Hirschmann concentration ration: HEXP = ∑ (xi/X)2; HEXP = ∑ (mi/M)2, where i = country groups (i = 1,..,6; the 5 presented in the table, the rest of the world 
being the sixth). 0< H < 100%, the higher the index, the higher the concentration of trade. 
Source: Author’s computations based on Romanian National Bank statistics and Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade database, 2004. 
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Table B.3.3. 
Indicators of Romania’s foreign trade with EU, 1993–2003 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
EU share in the merchan-
dise exports (%) 
41.4 48.2 54.2 56.5 56.5 64.5 65.5 63.8 67.8 67.1 67.7 
EU share in the merchan-
dise imports (%) 
45.3 48.2 50.5 52.3 52.5 57.7 60.7 56.6 57.3 58.4 57.7 
Coverage ratio (X/M, %) 68.5 86.5 82.6 76.3 80.5 78.5 88.7 89.6 86.6 89.2 86.1 
Trade deficit with EU 
(USD million) 
932 462 903 1417 1154 1471 710.5 770 1198.3 1121.5 1922.3 
Share of industrial prod-
ucts in the trade deficits 
(%) 
63.1 76.2 80.6 87.4 90.8 85.6 89.2 82.6 87.1 80.2 - 
Share of agricultural 
products in the trade defi-
cits (%) 
36.9 23.8 19.4 12.6 9.2 14.4 10.8 17.4 12.9 19.8 - 
Trade intensity (share of 
Romania’s exports to 
EU/share of EU imports in 
world imports) 
1.88 2.24 2.22 2.38 2.47 2.55 2.68 2.68 2.86 2.92 - 
Hirschmann specialization 
index of exports to EU  
(HEXP=∑(xi/X)
2) 
15.2 16.0 15.9 16.7 18.7 19.0 18.5 18.3 18.2 17.6 - 
Hirschmann specialization 
index of imports from EU 
(HEXP=∑(mi/M)
2) 
13.5 16.5 14.6 14.8 15.1 14.9 16.5 16.3 14.7 13.9 - 
Source: Author’s computations based on Romanian National Bank and EUROSTAT statistics, 2003 and 2004. 
 
Figure B.3.3. 
Romanian trade specialization/concentration with EU, 1993–2002 
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Hirschmann concentration ratio: HEXP= ∑(xi/X)2 and HIMP = ∑(mi/M)2, i = I,..., XII, where: xi = 
share of group i of products in total exports to EU; mi = share of group i of products in total imports 
from EU. 
Source: Author’s computations based on Romanian National Bank statistics, 2003. 
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Figure B.3.4. 
Technological structural changes in Romania’s trade with the EU, 1993–2002 
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Technology classification in line with National Programme for Romanian Foreign Trade Development in 
2003, developed by the Ministry of Development and Forecasting: high complexity: XVI, XVII, XVIII, XX; 
medium complexity: IV, VI, VII, X, XI, XII, XX; low complexity: I, II, III, V, VIII, IX, XV, XIII. 
Source: Author’s computations based on Romanian National Bank statistics, 2003. 
 
 
Figure B.3.5. 
Share of technology-intensive products in Romania’s trade with the EU, 1993–2002 
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Technology classification in line with Krauss, who split tradable products into four categories: natural 
resource-intensive, unskilled labour-intensive, human capital intensive, and technology intensive. The last 
includes machines and equipment (XVI), means of transportation (XVII), optical, medical instruments 
(XVIII) and chemical products (VI). 
Source: Author’s computations based on Romanian National Bank statistics, 2003 
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Table B.3.4. 
Structure of Romanian trade with EU: shares of products groups, 1993–2002 
 
USD million 
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Exports FOB 
1993 2.023.0 1.6 1.8 0.7 1.4 10.7 3.7 1.8 1.3 2.1 0.3 31.0 6.4 2.9 10.4 6.5 2.5 0.3 14.3 0.2 
1994 2.965.0 1.7 1.5 0.1 1.1 6.6 4.7 2.0 1.3 1.9 0.4 33.1 9.5 2.5 11.5 7.6 2.5 0.3 11.5 0.2 
1995 4.283.0 1.3 1.2 0.3 0.9 3.5 4.5 2.7 1.0 1.9 0.7 31.2 9.3 2.4 17.0 7.8 3.0 0.3 10.7 0.3 
1996 4.569.0 1.2 1.1 0.0 1.1 4.2 3.9 2.4 0.9 1.9 0.5 33.4 10.3 2.1 14.8 8.7 3.7 0.3 9.3 0.1 
1997 4.768.0 1.3 1.2 0.0 0.9 2.1 3.1 2.3 1.0 2.2 0.4 36.0 11.0 2.1 16.5 8.6 2.6 0.4 8.3 0.1 
1998 5.358.0 1.0 1.1 0.1 0.6 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.0 2.7 0.3 36.4 11.1 2.0 15.8 10.2 3.5 0.4 7.4 0.3 
1999 5.571.4 1.2 1.9 0.1 0.6 1.0 1.5 1.9 1.0 4.0 0.3 36.1 11.8 1.8 12.1 12.1 4.6 0.5 8.0 0.4 
2000 6.618.4 1.1 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.9 2.0 2.1 1.2 3.4 0.5 34.3 11.6 1.6 12.4 16.2 3.9 0.5 7.5 0.3 
2001 7.720.1 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.7 2.5 1.5 1.9 1.5 2.9 0.7 35.1 12.4 1.5 9.0 16.1 4.4 0.5 6.6 0.4 
2002 9.301.1 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 5.4 1.3 2.2 1.6 2.9 0.6 34.4 12.1 1.4 7.2 16.1 5.0 0.5 6.5 0.3 
Imports CIF 
1993 2.955.0 0.9 9.4 0.4 4.6 4.5 9.5 3.5 2.7 0.6 1.6 17.2 1.0 1.2 4.8 27.2 6.0 3.1 1.9 0.1 
1994 3.427.0 0.9 1.3 0.4 4.3 2.7 9.4 3.8 3.5 0.5 2.2 20.2 1.5 1.3 5.2 32.0 4.0 3.0 2.6 1.1 
1995 5.186.0 0.9 0.7 0.4 4.5 3.8 10.0 3.9 3.7 0.8 2.6 19.6 1.7 1.5 5.7 28.8 3.7 3.8 2.6 1.3 
1996 5.986.0 0.7 0.9 0.3 3.8 4.3 9.9 4.1 4.0 0.5 2.7 19.3 1.8 1.6 6.5 29.3 3.2 2.9 2.6 1.7 
1997 5.922.0 0.5 0.8 0.4 2.8 3.5 9.5 4.2 4.3 0.6 2.7 22.8 2.2 1.5 5.8 27.6 3.2 2.5 2.6 2.4 
1998 6.829.0 1.1 0.8 0.5 2.9 2.2 9.5 4.3 4.2 0.4 2.6 23.1 2.3 1.4 5.9 27.0 4.3 2.5 2.4 2.5 
1999 6.281.9 0.8 0.9 0.3 2.6 1.5 10.1 4.8 4.6 0.6 2.7 26.6 2.6 1.4 6.1 26.4 2.5 2.9 1.4 1.4 
2000 7.388.4 1.0 0.9 0.3 1.9 1.7 9.3 4.9 4.7 0.5 2.4 24.3 2.5 1.4 5.8 28.2 4.9 2.8 1.4 1.2 
2001 8.918.4 1.5 0.8 0.2 1.9 2.0 8.8 5.5 5.5 0.5 2.4 23.6 2.5 1.5 6.4 25.2 6.8 2.6 1.3 1.1 
2002 10.422.6 1.6 0.6 0.4 1.7 1.2 9.8 6.4 5.6 0.6 2.6 23.1 2.3 1.5 6.9 23.8 7.2 2.3 0.7 1.5 
Source: Author’s computations based on Romanian National Bank statistics, 2004. 
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Table B.3.5. 
Revealed comparative advantage in Romania’s foreign trade with EU, 1993–2002 
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IACRt = RCAt/100 
1993 0.55 -1.67 0.45 -1.20 0.88 -0.96 -0.66 -0.75 1.17 -1.66 0.59 1.81 0.90 0.78 -1.43 -0.86 -2.19 2.04 1.30 
1994 0.57 0.14 -1.87 -1.35 0.90 -0.70 -0.65 -0.95 1.30 -1.61 0.49 1.84 0.63 0.80 -1.44 -0.46 -2.30 1.48 -1.86 
1995 0.41 0.59 -0.36 -1.58 -0.07 -0.81 -0.38 -1.34 0.88 -1.26 0.47 1.70 0.44 1.09 -1.30 -0.21 -2.53 1.42 -1.62 
1996 0.60 0.23 -2.62 -1.25 -0.03 -0.95 -0.53 -1.52 1.28 -1.77 0.55 1.73 0.31 0.83 -1.21 0.13 -2.17 1.30 -2.95 
1997 0.94 0.42 -2.27 -1.16 -0.53 -1.12 -0.60 -1.44 1.33 -1.85 0.46 1.59 0.29 1.04 -1.16 2.07 -1.94 1.16 -2.97 
1998 -0.08 0.33 -2.09 -1.65 -0.08 -1.56 -0.71 -1.45 1.82 -2.09 0.45 1.56 0.31 0.98 -0.98 -0.21 -1.72 1.11 -2.11 
1999 0.46 0.76 -0.87 -1.56 -0.44 -1.91 -0.92 -1.50 1.93 -2.08 0.31 1.51 0.26 0.69 -0.78 0.60 -1.71 1.76 -1.30 
2000 0.11 0.00 -3.32 -1.34 -0.66 -1.52 -0.86 -1.32 1.82 -1.64 0.34 1.54 0.13 0.75 -0.56 -0.22 -1.71 1.79 -1.33 
2001 -0.26 0.41 -1.73 -1.02 0.19 -1.80 -1.09 -1.27 1.68 -1.27 0.40 1.62 -0.05 0.34 -0.45 -0.44 -1.64 1.73 -1.10 
2002 -0.54 0.50 -5.10 -1.29 1.50 -2.00 -1.08 -1.24 1.51 -1.54 0.40 1.66 -0.12 0.04 -0.39 -0.36 -1.50 1.73 -1.40 
The revealed comparative advantage index is calculated as 
100*/
/ln 

=
tt
ititit MX
mxRCA
 where: xit, =, exports of group of products i in the year t; Xt, =, total exports in 
the year t; mit, =, imports of group of products i in the year t; Mt, =, total imports in the year t; 
Source: Author’s computations based on Romanian National Bank statistics, 2004. 
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Table B.3.6. 
Intra/inter-industry trade estimation with Grubel–Lloyd index, in Romania’s foreign trade with EU, 1993–2002 
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IGL 
1993 0.55 0.81 0.92 0.23 0.96 0.34 0.76 0.42 0.52 0.49 0.62 0.23 0.89 0.39 0.74 0.80 0.28 0.45 0.14 0.32 0.57 
1994 0.58 0.93 0.79 1.00 0.24 0.37 0.64 0.60 0.62 0.50 0.48 0.30 0.83 0.31 0.76 0.68 0.34 0.70 0.16 0.42 0.24 
1995 0.59 0.90 0.89 0.80 0.73 0.29 0.87 0.54 0.72 0.35 0.67 0.38 0.86 0.36 0.88 0.58 0.37 0.80 0.12 0.45 0.28 
1996 0.61 0.87 0.84 0.98 0.11 0.36 0.85 0.46 0.62 0.29 0.53 0.23 0.86 0.38 0.98 0.73 0.37 0.93 0.16 0.53 0.08 
1997 0.51 0.89 0.65 0.90 0.15 0.40 0.64 0.42 0.61 0.32 0.49 0.22 0.88 0.40 0.96 0.61 0.40 0.27 0.21 0.56 0.08 
1998 0.62 0.88 0.84 0.96 0.18 0.26 0.84 0.28 0.56 0.31 0.34 0.18 0.89 0.42 0.97 0.65 0.46 0.78 0.25 0.59 0.17 
1999 0.63 0.94 0.83 0.69 0.54 0.31 0.72 0.23 0.52 0.33 0.28 0.20 0.91 0.40 0.93 0.72 0.58 0.76 0.28 0.33 0.39 
2000 0.66 0.95 1.00 0.94 0.06 0.38 0.63 0.33 0.55 0.39 0.31 0.30 0.88 0.39 0.99 0.69 0.68 0.84 0.28 0.32 0.38 
2001 0.68 0.93 0.80 0.87 0.27 0.48 0.98 0.25 0.45 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.87 0.37 0.90 0.90 0.71 0.72 0.29 0.34 0.45 
2002 0.66 0.94 0.68 0.81 0.01 0.40 0.40 0.21 0.46 0.41 0.40 0.32 0.86 0.35 0.88 0.96 0.75 0.77 0.33 0.33 0.36 
The unbalanced and balanced two-way trade Grubel-Lloyd indices between Romania and EU are calculated as MiXi
MiXiIGLit +
−−= 1
 and )iMXi
MiXiIGLit +∑
∑ −−= (1  where X and 
M are exports of a country and imports by a partner correspondingly of product i.  
Source: Author’s computations based on Romanian National Bank statistics, 2004 
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Table B.3.7. 
Intra-industry trade estimation with Overlap Index, in Romania’s foreign trade with EU, 1993–2002 
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1993 0.68 0.84 0.13 0.93 0.21 0.61 0.26 0.35 0.33 0.45 0.13 0.81 0.24 0.59 0.67 0.16 0.29 0.08 0.19 0.40 
1994 0.87 0.65 1.00 0.13 0.22 0.47 0.43 0.45 0.34 0.32 0.17 0.71 0.18 0.61 0.52 0.20 0.54 0.09 0.26 0.14 
1995 0.83 0.81 0.67 0.58 0.17 0.77 0.37 0.56 0.22 0.50 0.23 0.76 0.22 0.78 0.41 0.23 0.67 0.07 0.29 0.16 
1996 0.76 0.72 0.96 0.06 0.22 0.74 0.30 0.45 0.17 0.36 0.13 0.76 0.23 0.96 0.57 0.23 0.87 0.09 0.36 0.04 
1997 0.81 0.48 0.82 0.08 0.25 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.19 0.33 0.13 0.79 0.25 0.93 0.44 0.25 0.16 0.12 0.39 0.04 
1998 0.78 0.73 0.92 0.10 0.15 0.72 0.16 0.39 0.18 0.21 0.10 0.81 0.27 0.93 0.48 0.30 0.64 0.14 0.42 0.10 
1999 0.89 0.71 0.53 0.37 0.19 0.57 0.13 0.35 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.83 0.25 0.87 0.57 0.41 0.62 0.16 0.19 0.24 
2000 0.90 1.00 0.90 0.03 0.23 0.46 0.20 0.38 0.24 0.18 0.17 0.79 0.24 0.98 0.53 0.51 0.72 0.16 0.19 0.24 
2001 0.87 0.67 0.77 0.15 0.31 0.95 0.14 0.29 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.77 0.23 0.82 0.82 0.55 0.56 0.17 0.20 0.29 
2002 0.89 0.52 0.68 0.01 0.25 0.25 0.12 0.30 0.26 0.25 0.19 0.75 0.21 0.79 0.93 0.61 0.62 0.20 0.20 0.22 
The overlap index is calculated as );max(/);min(OI MitXitMitXit= . 
Source: Author’s computations based on Romanian National Bank statistics, 2004. 
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Table B.3.8. 
Types of trade flows between Romania and EU, 2002 
 
Prevalence of two-way flows (%) Prevalence of one-way flows (%) 
Industries 
High 
Overlap 
Index (OI)
High Gru-
bel-Lloyd 
Index 
(IGL) 
Low, posi-
tive re-
vealed 
compar-
ative ad-
vantage 
(IARC) 
Low, negative
revealed 
comparative 
advantage 
(IARC) 
Share in 
total ex-
ports to 
EU 
Share in 
total im-
ports 
from EU
Industries 
Low Over-
lap Index 
(OI) 
Low Gru-
bel–Lloyd 
Index (IGL)
High, posi-
tive re-
vealed 
comparative 
advantage 
(IARC) 
High, nega-
tive 
revealed 
comparative 
advantage 
(IARC) 
Share in 
total ex-
ports to 
EU 
Share in 
total im-
ports from 
EU 
II. 0.68 0.81 + 0.50  1.0 0.6 V. 0.25 0.40 + 1.50  5.4 1.2 
XI. 0.75 0.86 + 0.40  34.4 23.1 IX 0.25 0.40 + 1.51  2.9 0.6 
XV. 0.93 0.96 + 0.04  7.2 6.9 XII. 0.21 0.35 + 1.66  12.1 2.3 
XX. 0.20 0.33 + 1.73  6.5 0.7 Total share of trade with positive RCA 42.6 30.6 
Total share of trade with a positive RCA 26.9 4.8 
I.  0.52 0.68  - 0.54 1.0 1.6 III. 0.01 0.01  - 5.10 0.0 0.4 
XIII. 0.79 0.88  - 0.12 1.4 1.5 IV. 0.25 0.40  - 1.29 0.5 1.7 
XVI. 0.61 0.75  - 0.39 16.1 23.8 VI. 0.12 0.21  - 2.00 1.3 9.8 
XVII 0.62 0.77  - 0.36 5.0 7.2 VII. 0.30 0.46  - 1.08 2.2 6.4 
VIII. 0.26 0.41  -1.24 1.6 5.6 
X. 0.19 0.32  -1.54 0.6 2.6 
XVIII. 0.20 0.33  - 1.50 0.5 2.3 
XXII. 0.22 0.36  -1.40 0.3 1.5 
Total share of trade with negative RCA 23.5 34.1 
Total share of trade with a negative RCA 6.9 30.5 
Total share of prevalence two-way flow trade in total 
trade 
66.1 64.7 Total share of prevalence one-way flow trade in total trade 33.9 35.3 
I. Live animals and animal products; II. Vegetal products; III. Animal or vegetal fats and oil; IV. Food, beverages, tobacco; V. Mineral products; VI. Chemical prod-
ucts; VII. Plastics, rubber and articles thereof; VIII. Raw hides and skins, leather, fur skins and articles thereof; IX. Wood and wood products, other than furniture; 
X. Pulp of wood, paper, paperboard; XI. Textiles and textile articles; XII. Footwear, headgear, umbrellas and other similar products; XIII. Articles of stone, plastics, 
glass, cement, ceramics; XV. Base metals and articles; XVI. Machines and equipment; XVII. Vehicles and associated transport equipment; XVIII. Optical, photographic, 
cinematographic, medical or surgical instruments, clocks and musical instruments and components; XX. Miscellaneous manufactured articles, inlc. furniture; XXII. 
Products not elsewhere. 
Source: Author’s computations based on table B.3.5, B.3.6., B.3.7. 
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Figure B.3.6. 
Romanian trade competitiveness relative to EU: Grubel-Lloyd index (IGL) and Revealed Comparative Advantage Index, 1993–2002 
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Source: Author’s computations based on Romanian National Bank statistics, 2004. 
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Figure B.3.7. 
Romanian intra-industry trade (IGL) relative to sectoral trade surplus/deficit with EU, 2002 
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Source: Author’s computations based on Romanian National Bank statistics, 2004 
  
87
C) Trade approach vs. development approach 
 
Figure C.1. 
EBRD liberalization index and GDP real annual growth in Romania (1989 = 100), 
1991–2001 
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Source: EBRD Transition Reports, 2002. 
 
 
Figure C.2. 
Trade vs. GDP dynamics in Romania, 1997–2005 
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Source: WIIW Statistics, 2004 
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Figure C.3. 
Growth in real GDP (1989 = 100) and average value of EBRD liberalization index 
(1991–2001) 
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? Countries excluded from the regression due to the questionable quality of statistical data. 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2002. 
 
 
Figure C.4. 
Gini coefficient (1996–8) and average value of EBRD liberalization index (1991–8) 
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Source: Making Transition Work for Everyone: Poverty and Inequality in Europe and Central Asia, 
World Bank 2000, EBRD Transition Reports. 
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Figure C.5. 
Average value of the EBRD liberalization index and average rating of political and civil liberties 
(1991–2001) 
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Figure C.6. 
Government outlays (2001) and corruption perception in the transition economies (2003) 
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D) Growth Competitiveness Convergence Index –  
a new method for CEE convergence estimation in 2003 
 
Table D.1. 
CEE convergence in terms of growth competitiveness with EU, 2003 
 
Macroeconomic environment index components Public institutions index Technology index 
% of EU 
average 
Index 
(GCI) Total 
Macroeco-
nomic sta-
bility subin-
dex 
Government 
waste 
subindex 
Country 
credit rating Total 
Contracts 
and law 
subindex 
Corruption 
index Total 
Innovation 
subindex 
Information 
and com-
munication 
technology 
subindex 
Technology 
transfer 
subindex 
Estonia 93.75 88.82 102.02 89.73 67.66 93.84 90.62 96.17 105.69 84.86 98.97 107.82 
Slovenia 91.80 86.79 94.17 84.70 75.61 89.46 82.96 94.85 96.88 88.13 94.15 90.95 
Hungary 90.04 83.13 89.01 87.67 74.54 90.69 84.45 87.63 93.61 69.80 83.45 103.70 
Latvia 89.45 89.02 106.50 87.90 58.96 82.46 81.65 79.59 99.14 88.38 84.35 104.32 
Czech Republic 88.67 87.60 100.67 58.90 72.70 80.71 71.19 85.50 96.47 64.53 89.87 110.08 
Lithuania 87.70 82.93 98.88 66.21 58.50 78.96 72.68 90.75 99.14 78.84 81.67 95.68 
Slovakia 87.50 82.11 97.53 62.10 56.05 82.46 63.90 85.99 90.74 64.78 85.59 105.56 
Poland 84.57 77.64 90.58 61.87 69.34 75.81 67.08 77.95 93.20 80.34 77.75 102.26 
Bulgaria 81.05 77.85 82.96 61.87 69.34 73.00 50.63 90.26 90.94 65.03 70.26 77.98 
Romania 66.02 59.55 80.04 44.52 40.32 57.25 55.49 58.75 80.50 57.75 66.87 97.33 
* The convergence of technology transfer process is relative to the average indices for Spain and Portugal, the only data available. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the World Economic Forum Database, 2004. 
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Table D.2. 
Romanian convergence in terms of growth competitiveness with CEE countries and EU, 2003 
 
 
Macroeconomic environment index components Public institutions index Technology index 
% of EU 
average 
Index 
(GCI) 
Total 
Macroeco-
nomic sta-
bility subin-
dex 
Government 
waste 
subindex 
Country 
credit rat-
ing 
Total 
Contracts 
and law 
subindex 
Corruption 
index Total 
Innovation 
subindex 
Information 
and com-
munication 
technology 
subindex 
Technology 
transfer 
subindex 
Romanian  
indices 3.38 2.93 3.57 1.95 2.64 3.27 2.97 3.58 3.93 2.30 3.75 4.73 
% of EU 
average 66.02 59.55 80.04 44.52 40.32 57.25 55.49 58.75 80.50 57.75 66.87 97.33 
% of CEEC  
average 77.54 73.25 84.94 63.11 62.71 70.93 77.00 69.33 87.53 77.78 83.95 97.75 
 
EU 15 
average 5.12 4.92 4.46 4.38 6.55 5.71 5.35 6.09 4.88 3.98 5.61 4.86 
St’d dv. 0.43 0.35 0.19 0.84 0.34 0.57 0.66 0.56 0.51 0.81 0.46 0.09 
  – conv. 8.40 7.11 4.26 19.18 5.19 9.98 12.34 9.20 10.45 20.35 8.20 1.85 
Minimum Italy Greece Portugal Italy Greece Italy Italy Greece Italy Luxembourg Greece Spain 
Maximum Finland Finland Finland Finland Luxembourg Denmark Finland Denmark Finland Finland Finland Portugal 
 
CEE 10 
Average 4.36 4.00 4.20 3.09 4.21 4.61 3.86 5.16 4.49 2.96 4.67 4.84 
St’d dv. 0.45 0.46 0.36 0.65 0.68 0.59 0.66 0.63 0.40 0.42 0.53 0.44 
  – conv. 10.32 11.50 8.57 21.04 16.15 12.80 17.10 12.21 8.91 14.19 11.35 9.09 
Minimum Romania Romania Romania Romania Romania Romania Romania Romania Bulgaria Romania Romania Bulgaria 
Maximum Estonia Estonia Latvia Estonia Slovenia Estonia Estonia Estonia Estonia Latvia Estonia Czech R. 
* In the case of the EU, the technology transfer index is weighted with 0, as these are core-innovator economies. The average of Spain and Portugal is used, as the 
only indices available. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the World Economic Forum Database, 2004. 
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Table D.3. 
Comparison between GCI, BCI, DB Research Convergence Indicators 
and GDP/capita convergence 
 
IGC Convergence 
Indicator 2003 
BCI Convergence 
Indicator 2003 
DB Research Convergence 
Indicator 2003 
GDP/capita 2001 (% 
UEM, PPP) 
 
Rank % of EU 15 
mean 
Rank Rank % of EU 15 
mean 
Rank % of EU 15 
mean 
Estonia  1. 93.75 1. 4. 69.8 5. 42.4 
Slovenia  2. 91.80 3. 1. 79.6 1. 71.5 
Hungary  3. 90.04 5. 6. 69.0 3. 51.1 
Latvia  4. 89.45 2. 5. 69.3 8. 32.2 
Czech Republic 5. 88.67 4. 2. 70.6 2. 61.4 
Lithuania  6. 87.70 6. 8. 66.3 7. 35.3 
Slovakia 7. 87.50 7. 3. 70.3 4. 49.9 
Poland  8. 84.57 8. 7. 67.4 6. 39.4 
Bulgaria  9. 81.05 10. 9. 65.8 10. 29.4 
Romania  10. 66.02 9. 10 63.5 9. 29.6 
Source: Author’s calculations, 2004. 
 
 
Table D.4. 
Scenarios for the CEE 10 GDP per capita and GCI catch-up with EU 
 
 2001 20102) 20202) 20302) 
Years to 
EU aver-
age1)—
optimistic 
scenario
Years to 
EU aver-
age2)—
pessimis-
tic sce-
nario 
Index 
GCI 
2003 
(% of EU 
average) 
Years to 
EU aver-
age1)—
optimistic 
scenario
Years to 
EU aver-
age2)—
pessimis-
tic sce-
nario 
Slovenia 71.5 76.2 80.6 84.1 32.3 65.8 93.75 3.4 21.3 
Czech Republic 61.4 67.8 73.7 78.5 44.3 80.8 91.80 4.2 39.2 
Hungary 51.5 59.6 66.9 73.0 53.3 92.1 90.04 13.8 52.1 
Slovakia 49.9 58.2 65.9 72.1 54.6 93.7 89.45 16.6 55.9 
Estonia 42.4 52.0 60.8 67.9 60.1 100.6 88.67 20.2 60.6 
Poland 39.4 49.5 58.7 66.3 62.1 103.2 87.70 24.2 66.0 
Lithuania 35.3 46.1 55.9 64.0 64.7 106.4 87.50 25.0 67.1 
Latvia 32.2 43.5 53.8 62.3 66.5 108.7 84.57 35.4 81.0 
Romania 29.6 41.3 52.0 60.8 68.0 110.6 81.05 45.6 94.6 
Bulgaria 29.4 41.2 51.9 60.7 68.1 110.7 66.02 74.5 133.3 
UEM 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - - - - 
1) Optimistic scenario: a 2.5% annual shrink in the difference between each country and the EU. 
2) Pessimistic scenario: a 2% annual shrink in the difference between each country and EU. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
